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Articles
RESTATING RESTITUTION:
A CASE OF CONTEMPORARY COMMON LAW CONCEPTUALISM
CHAIM SAIMAN*
ABSTRACT
The American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) of Restitution provides
one of the most interesting expressions of contemporary legal conceptual-
ism. This paper explores the theory and practice of post-realist conceptu-
alism through a review and critique of the Restatement. At the theoretical
level, the paper develops a typology of different forms of conceptualism
and shows that the Restatement has more in common with the high formal-
ism of the nineteenth century than with contemporary modes of private
law discourse. At the level of substantive doctrine, the paper explains why
labels, in fact, make a difference and assesses which recoveries are more
(and less) likely under the Restatement's scheme. The final section returns
to consider why the Restatement reprises the jurisprudence of classical for-
malism. I suggest that the mythos of legal conceptualism is necessary for
introducing a new field that claims to reflect foundational principles of
the common law's system of private ordering. Further this mode of dis-
course helps overcome the dissonance of creating a new field of law in a
work that purports to restate existing doctrine.
I. INTRODUCTION
IT has been widely observed that many of the so-called core doctrines of
the common law are actually the inventions of legal scholars in the late
nineteenth century.1 Before that time, the law was organized around pro-
cedures embedded in the medieval forms of action rather than around
substantive categories such as contract and tort. Toward the end of the
nineteenth century, legal theorists reorganized the existing rules, chang-
ing some and providing updated rationales for others, and created a more
systemic approach to law based on rationalized legal principles. 2 This sys-
tematization program has had a considerable impact on the structure of
* Assistant Professor of Law, Villanova Law School. J.D., Columbia Law
School, 2001. Law Clerk to Hon. Michael McConnell, 10th Circuit Court of
Appeals, 2003-04. John M. Olin Fellow, Harvard Law School, 2004-05. Samuel
Golieb Fellow in Legal History, New York University School of Law, 2005-06.
1. See, e.g., James Gordley, The Common Law in the Twentieth Century: Some Un-
finished Business, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1815, 1817-21 (2000).
2. See id.
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legal thought as contemporary private law doctrine is still charted largely
on nineteenth century coordinates.
Conceptualism is the central analytic tool associated with this period.
While the term sustains many definitions, central to all is the idea that
numerous lower-level rules (the individual rules of law used to decide
cases) are connected to each other through a legal concept that is more
general and abstract than the rules themselves. For example, the specific
rule against reliance damages in contract reflects the general concept that
a contract enforces the agreement between the parties. The doctrine of
duress might be explained along similar lines, as it refuses to enforce an
agreement whose consent is illusory. Overall, conceptualism is a useful
tool for developing a systematic account of law because it shows how a
multitude of individual cases can be subsumed under a single organizing
principle. Furthermore, the conceptual account portrays law as a series of
interrelated decisions that are connected through a common analytical
basis. In turn, these concepts are derived through a scientific study of the
law's raw material: reported cases.
Conceptualism is also said to promote predictability. Even the most
comprehensive legal system cannot have a rule that covers every case, and
if tried it would result in hundreds of conflicting and overlapping rules.
Conceptualism solves this problem by claiming that the concept, together
with rigorous legal analysis, can produce the correct result to every legal
question, even if no specific rule had been previously stated. The legal
concept is thus greater than the sum of the underlying parts because it
ensures that there are no (or very few) gaps in the system. This serves the
values of legal determinacy, the rule of law and judicial restraint.
Since the early decades of the twentieth century, however, this version
of classical legal thought has been subject to successive rounds of criticism
by generations of scholars. Legal realism, conceptualism's chief antago-
nist, expresses deep suspicion towards interlocking systems of legal rules,
arguing that 'judges respond primarily to the facts of the case, rather than
to the legal rules and reasons."3 Realists further demonstrated that the
concepts were easily manipulated, so that a skillful advocate could deduce
a number of conflicting rules from a single general concept. In one way
or another, realists believe that the actual bases of legal decisions lie
outside the formal boundaries of the law, and that law is far more influ-
enced by economic, political and social factors than the conceptualist vi-
sion is willing to admit. In time, the realist position became the orthodoxy
in academic circles and classical conceptualism ceased to be a respectable
mode of legal argument.
Of late, the common law of restitution, alternately called the law of
unjust enrichment, has entered a second wave of conceptualization. If res-
3. Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE BLAcKwELL GUIDE TO PHILOSO-
PHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 50 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson
eds., 2004).
[Vol. 52: p. 487
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titution sounds unfamiliar, fear not. Until a few years ago even Lance
Liebman, the former Dean of Columbia Law School and director of the
American Law Institute ("ALI"), was not quite sure what it meant either.4
This lack of awareness is often blamed on the fact that despite some initial
efforts, restitution, at least in the United States, was largely forgotten over
the latter half of the twentieth century. 5 Thus, despite initial stirrings in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the field called "restitu-
tion" is hardly recognizable within American law.6
4. See Lance Liebman, Forward, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION, ix-xi
(Discussion Draft, 2000).
5. See Chaim Saiman, Restitution in America: Why the U.S. Refuses to Join the
Global Restitution Party (an. 31, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Vil-
lanova Law Review).
6. Although proving that something does not exist is difficult, it is quite ap-
parent that restitution has not grabbed the attention of the United States academy.
Since 1980, 1 am aware of only one book published on the American law of restitu-
tion-written by an Israeli law professor and published by an English publisher
(Cambridge University Press)-which itself contains far more non-U.S. references
and materials than a comparative work on torts or contracts. See generally HANOCH
DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION (2004). The lone treatise is a prod-
uct of the 1970s and reflects the scholarly modality of a different era. See generally
GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION (1978). And while a second Restate-
ment of Restitution was started in the mid 1980s, it was aborted after only two drafts
were published. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION (Tentative Draft No.
2, 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1983).
Furthermore, no more than a handful of the 170+ American law schools offer a
course devoted exclusively to restitution, nor, should a school want to offer such a
course. Also, there is no current casebook specifically addressing this field.
Searching for articles with the title words "restitution," "unjust enrichment,"
"change of position," "quasi contract" and "constructive trust" in the law reviews of
first and second tier law schools since January 1, 2000 (and discarding articles deal-
ing with restitution in the criminal law sense) produced the following list of arti-
cles: Mark Gergen, Restitution as a Bridge Over Troubled Contractual Water, 71
FORDHAM L. REv. 709 (2002); Andrew Kull, Restitution's Outlaws, 78 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 17 (2003); Andrew Kull, Defenses to Restitution: The Bona Fide Creditor, 81 B.U. L.
REV. 919 (2001) [hereinafter Kull, Defenses to Restitution]; Peter Linzer, Rough Jus-
tice: A Theory of Restitution and Reliance, Contracts and Torts, 2001 Wis. L. REv. 695
(2001); Colleen P. Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary Restitution, 55 SMU L. REV. 1577
(2002); Emily Sherwin, Love, Money, and Justice: Restitution Between Cohabitants, 77 U.
CoLo. L. REv. 711 (2006); James Steven Rogers, Restitution for Wrongs and the Re-
statement (Third) of the Law of Restitution (Boston Coll. Law School Research Paper
No. 107, Sep. 1, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=927979. Professor
Linzer's piece is actually a critique of the Restatement's model of restitution, rather
than an independent article. The search also revealed three book reviews of Ha-
noch Dagan's recent book The Law and Ethics of Restitution. In addition there have
been two symposia dedicated to restitution as understood by Professor Kull. In the
first, Symposium, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1763 (2001),
only three of the twelve articles were written by law professors based in the United
States. In the second, Symposium, Second Remedies Discussion Forum: Restitution, 36
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 991 (2003), the numbers were more balanced (nine of fourteen
papers by scholars based in the United States).
This output must be compared to the explosion of commonwealth restitution
scholarship in the past twenty years. Recent treatises dealing with this subject, all
published outside the United States, include: JACK BEATSON, THE USE AND ABUSE
OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT: ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF RESTITUTION (1991); PETER B.
2007] 489
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This, however, is changing. Following developments in the Common-
wealth and Europe, there is a push for the American common law to re-
cover the field of restitution. Leading this effort is the ALI, through the
emerging drafts of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrich-
ment.7 The Restatement's central goal is to reestablish restitution as a doctri-
BIRKS, UNJUST ENRICHMENT (2d. ed. 2005); PETER B. BIRKs & ROBERT CHAMBERS,
THE RESTITUTION RESEARCH RESOURCE (1st ed. 1994); PETER B. BiRKS, RESTITUTION:
THE FUTURE (1992); PETER B. BIRKs, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF RESTITU-
TION (1985) [hereinafter BiRs, INTRODUCTION TO RESTITUTION]; ANDREW BUR-
ROWS, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION (Hedely & Halliwell eds., 2002); ANDREW BURROWS
ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF RESTITUTION (2d ed. 2007); DAGAN,
supra; JACQUES ETIENNE DU PLESSIS, COMPULSION AND RESTITUTION: A HISTORICAL
AND COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE TREATMENT OF COMPULSION IN SCOTTISH PRIVATE
LAW WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON ITS RELEVANCE TO THE LAW OF RESTITUTION AND
UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT (2004); ROBERT GOFF & GARETH JONES, THE LAw OF REs-
TITUTION (5th ed. 1998); STEVE HEDLEY, RESTITUTION: ITS DIVISION AND ORDERING
(2001); IAN McNEIL JACKMAN, THE VARIETIES OF RESTITUTION (1998); GEORGE B.
KLIPPERT, UNJUST ENRICHMENT (1983); LAW COMMISSION [OF GREAT BRITAIN], RESTI-
TUTION OF PAYMENTS MADE UNDER A MISTAKE OF LAW (1991); MITCHELL MCINNES,
RESTITUTION: DEVELOPMENTS IN UNJUST ENRICHMENT (1996); NEW SOUTH WALES
LAW REFORM COMMISSION, RESTITUTION OF BENEFITS CONFERRED UNDER MISTAKE OF
LAW (1987); RESTITUTION (INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF ESSAYS IN LAW AND LEGAL
THEORY) (Lionel D. Smith ed., 2001); RESTITUTION & BANKING LAW (Francis D.
Rose ed., 1999); RESTITUTION AND INSOLVENCY (Francis Rose ed., 2000); RESTITU-
TION, PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF GARETH JONES (W.R.
Cornish et a]. eds., 1998); CRAIG ROTHERHAM, PROPRIETARY REMEDIES IN CONTEXT
(2002); SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION, RECOVERY OF BENEFITS CONFERRED UNDER ER-
ROR OF LAW (1993); ANDREW SKELTON, RESTITUTION AND CONTRACT (1998); ALl
SMITH & LIONEL D. SMITH, THE LAW OF TRACING (1997); ROBERT STEVENS, RESTITU-
TION IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (2002); THE SEARCH FOR PRINCIPLE: ESSAYS
IN HONOUR OF LORD GOFF OF CHIEVELEY (William Swadling & Gareth Jones
eds., 2000); UNDERSTANDING UNJUST ENRICHMENT (Jason W. Neyers et al. eds.,
2004); UNJUST ENRICHMENT: THE COMPARATIVE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE LAW OF RES-
TITUTION (VERGLEICHENDE UNTERSUCHUNGEN ZUR KONTINENTALEUROPAISCHEN UND
ANGLO-AMERIKANISCHEN RECHTSGESCHICHTE) (EltjoJ.H. Schrage ed., 1995); UNJUS-
TIFIED ENRICHMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION (Paul W.L.
Russell ed., 1997).
7. At present, the drafts of the Restatement include the RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007); RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (Tentative Draft No. 4,
2005); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (Tentative
Draft No. 3, 2004); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICH-
MENT (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND
UNJUST ENRICHMENT (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTI-
TUTION (Discussion Draft). In each draft, the ALI is careful to note that:
As of the date of publication, this Draft has not been considered by the
members of The American Law Institute and does not represent the posi-
tion of the Institute on any of the issues with which it deals. The action, if
any, taken by the members with respect to this Draft may be ascertained
by consulting the Annual Proceedings of the Institute, which are pub-
lished following each Annual Meeting.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT i (Tentative Draft
No. 4). As used in this article, the term "Restatement" represents the views of tenta-
tive drafts which have not, as of yet, received the ALI's sanction. Nevertheless,
participants at the ALI meetings have noted that Kull's views face little to no oppo-
sition from the membership. See Mark Gergen, The Restatement Third, Restitution
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nal category like contract and tort; a category that itself can be a source of
legal rights and liabilities.8 According to the Restatement, liability can be
said to lie in restitution, much as we currently speak of liability arising in
contract and tort.
The Restatement reprises the arguments of the nineteenth century,
claiming that while the name might be new, the idea of restitution has
existed all along, even if no one quite noticed it. Thus the Restatement
claims that a large number of doctrines going by the names of quasi con-
tract, quantum meruit, implied contracts, constructive trusts, equitable
liens and equitable subrogation, as well as several others, are in fact uni-
fied by a single idea known as unjust enrichment. Going forward, courts
should expressly proclaim that they are dealing with restitution issues and
decide these cases according to the rules and principles of restitution.
The Restatement project raises several questions. First, how exactly
does a group of scholars go about rediscovering a legal field? Where has it
been hiding? Second, what does it mean for the law to be conceptualized
and rationalized? How is this different than the usual process of ground-
ing decisions in precedent and logical argument? Third, what is the prac-
tical impact of the Restatement project? Does conceptualization make any
difference, or is it simply a matter of putting a different label on an ex-
isting doctrine? Fourth, why do we all of a sudden need to recover restitu-
tion now? And finally, why does the law of restitution warrant a return to
the mode of legal thinking that has been out of fashion for most of the
twentieth century?
This article answers these questions in six parts. Part II reviews the
work product of the Restatement and explains how it attempts to transform
the mass of seemingly unrelated doctrines into a unified conceptual field.
Part III evaluates the Restatement's analysis and explores the assumptions
underlying the Restatement's legal conceptualism. Part IV examines the Re-
statement's jurisprudence in terms of other expressions of post-realist con-
ceptualism. Part V turns to assess the impact of conceptualization on
substantive doctrine. Part VI concludes by examining why, after nearly a
century in exile, classical legal thought makes a comeback in the Restate-
ment of Restitution.
II. THE RESTATEMENT PROJECT
How does the Restatement go about recovering the law of restitution?
A review of the emerging Restatement drafts and the scholarly writings of its
principal architect, Professor Andrew Kull, reveals four basic moves. First,
restitution is shown to be a body of positive law that accounts for recov-
eries not captured by traditional contract and tort doctrine. Second, resti-
and Unjust Enrichment at Midpoint, 56 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 289, 291 n.10 (2003)
[hereinafter Gergen, Restatement at Midpoint].
8. See Lance Liebman, Forward, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION ix-xi
(Discussion Draft).
2007]
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tution is defined in terms of unjust enrichment, which provides the
conceptual underpinning for a large number of existing doctrines. Third,
the constituent sub-doctrines are restructured to accord with unjust en-
richment principles. Finally, doctrines that cannot be made to conform
are expelled from restitution's orbit.
A. Restitution as a Substantive Field
1. Background
While elements of restitution have been around at least since Lord
Mansfield's time, its modern incarnation is largely the product of scholar-
ship of the late nineteenth and early-to-mid-twentieth centuries.9 Al-
though William Keener first published a treatise on the law of quasi
contract in 1893, the term "restitution" is generally credited to Professors
Warren Seavey and Austin Scott,10 the authors of the first Restatement on
Restitution. Seavey and Scott combined the learning on quasi contracts
with the constructive trust and other remedies stemming from equity."
They claimed:
In bringing [a number of recurring] situations together under
one heading, the [American Law] Institute expresses the convic-
tion that they are all subject to one unitary principle which here-
tofore has not had general recognition. In this it has recognized
the tripartite division of the law into contracts, torts, and restitu-
tion, the division being made with reference to the purpose
which each subject serves in protecting one of three fundamental
interests.12
Seavey and Scott further argued that restitution
9. The development of the doctrinal field is sketched out in Andrew Kull,
James Barr Ames and the Early Modern History of Unjust Enrichment, 25 Ox. J. LEGAL
STUD. 297 (2005) [hereinafter Kull, Ames and Unjust Enrichment]; see also RICHARD
M. JACKSON, THE HISTORY OF QUAsI-CoNTRAcT IN ENGLISH LAw (1936); DUNCAN
KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 177-81 (Beard Books
2006) (1975); J.B. Ames, A History of Assumpsit, 2 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1888); Joseph
Perillo, Restitution in a Contractual Context, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1208 (1973) [herein-
after Perillo, Restitution in a Contractual Setting].
10. Seavey and Scott seemed aware that they were introducing the term to the
world. See Warren A. Seavey & Austin W. Scott, Restatement, 54 L.Q.R. 29, 31
(1938); see also Peter B. Birks, A Letter to America: The New Restatement on Restitution,
in GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIER (2003) (discussing naming of First Restatement). But
see generally Kull, Ames and Unjust Enrichment, supra note 9 (arguing that Ames de-
serves primary credit for recognizing unity of restitution law).
11. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION: QUASI CONTRACT AND CON-
STRUCTIVE TRUST (1937).
12. Seavey & Scott, supra note 10, at 31. In the first Restatement cases are or-
ganized under the following headings: Mistake, Coercion, Benefits Conferred at
Request, Benefits Voluntarily Conferred Without Mistake, Coercion or Request,
Benefits Lawfully Acquired Which Are Not Conferred by the Person Claiming Res-
titution, and Benefits Tortuously Acquired. See id.
[Vol. 52: p. 487
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is a third [branch of the common law], sometimes overlapping
with the others, but different in its purpose. This third postulate,
which underlies the rules assembled in the Restatement under
the heading "Restitution," can be expressed as thus: A person has
a right to have restored to him a benefit gained at his expense by
another, if the retention of the benefit by the other would be
unjust. 13
Despite the efforts of the first Restatement and those of mid-century
American scholars, most notably, John Dawson's Unjust Enrichment, George
Palmer's treatise, The Law of Restitution and John Wade's casebook, Cases
and Materials on Restitution, 4 restitution law and scholarship has largely
disappeared from the American scene. 15 While the law of quasi contracts
and constructive trusts is undeniably part of American law, the idea that
restitution is its own body of law with policies and principles that are dis-
tinct from contract and tort has faded from the forefront of American
jurisprudence.
The modern Restatement looks to revive, and in many ways improve
upon, these earlier efforts. Restitution is needed because "orthodox tort"
and contract law do not account for a number of established doctrines. 16
Unjust enrichment "describes[s] the fundamental grounds [for] liability
in restitution,"' 7 and "restitution (meaning the law of unjust or unjustified
enrichment) is itself a source of obligations, analogous in this respect to
tort or contract."1 8 By using a slight yet important shift in language, how-
ever, the new Restatement pushes the conceptual account of restitution one
step further. In the first Restatement, "restitution" is used as a concrete
noun: "A person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of an-
other is required to make restitution to the other."' 9 Here "restitution" signi-
fies the nature of the payment. The new Restatement, by contrast, uses the
term as an abstract noun where restitution is presented as the source of legal
liability; thus, "[a] person who is unjustly enriched at the expense of an-
other is liable in restitution to the other."
20
13.. Id. at 32.
14. JOHN W. WADE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON RESTITUTION (2d ed. 1966). The
first edition of this casebook was published in 1958.
15. See Saiman, supra note 5.
16. See Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1191, 1192-93
(1995) [hereinafter Kull, Rationalizing Restitution]; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
RESTITUTION § 1 cmt. a (Discussion Draft, 2000).
17. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 1 cmt. b (Discussion Draft).
18. Id. § 1 cmt. h.
19. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937) (emphasis added).
20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 1 (Discussion Draft) (emphasis
added). Both of these formulations contrast sharply with the language of the
aborted Restatement (Second) of Restitution that read: "A person who receives a bene-
fit by reason of an infringement of another person's interest, or of loss suffered by
the other, owes restitution to him in the manner and amount necessary to prevent
2007]
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2. Positivizing the Law
Bringing restitution into the common law fold involves convincing
courts that it is a legitimate area of the law with defined rules that can be
predictably applied. The Restatement operates both against ignorance and
indifference to restitution on the one hand, and ambivalence, or even hos-
tility, on the other. The hostility is predicated on the assumption that res-
titution is little more than accumulated bits of discretion garbed as
doctrine. Despite the Restatemmt's dismissal, however, this view traces back
to the birth of unjust enrichment under Lord Mansfield, who held that
"[iln one word, the gist of this kind of action is, that the defendant, upon
the circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of natural justice and
equity to refund the money."2 1 Inevitably, the association of unjust en-
richment with natural law and equity, together with the historical fact that
at least parts of the law of restitution trace their origin to courts of equity
(and the subsequent mis-association of the equity courts as standardless),
generated an aversion to restitution and led to its banishment to the
nether regions of the common law.
22
The Restatement, by contrast, presents restitution as a positivized, rule-
based legal field. Its opening section claims that "instances of unjustified
enrichment are both predictable and objectively determined" in part "be-
cause the justification in question is not moral but legal."2 3 In support,
the Restatement points to several morally questionable transactions and,
with a tinge of pride, asserts that the law of restitution offers no re-
unjust enrichment." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION § 1 (Tentative Draft
No. 1, 1983).
Two important differences emerge. First, the Restatement (Second) envisions
restitution as based on plaintiffs' losses rather than the exclusive focus on defend-
ants' gains mandated by the first and third Restatements. Second, the Restatement
(Second)'s definition stresses restitution's remedial rather than substantive role.
Restitution is described as a remedy to enforce rights generated elsewhere (pre-
sumably by tort or contract) rather than as its own source of substantive rights and
duties coequal to tort and contract.
21. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 1 cmt. b (Discussion Draft)
(quoting Moses v. Mcferlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B. 1760) (capitaliza-
tion modernized)).
22. For example, a recent decision by the Alabama Supreme Court held that:
The doctrine of unjust enrichment is an old equitable remedy permitting
the court in equity and good conscience to disallow one to be unjustly
enriched at the expense of another. ... A claim for restitution is equita-
ble in nature, and permits a trial court to balance the equities and to take
into account competing principles to determine if the defendant was un-
justly enriched. Consequently, the success of a claim for unjust enrich-
ment depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case.
Scrushy v. Taylor, No. 1050564, 2006 WL 2458818, at *11 (Ala. Aug. 25, 2006)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A scholarly treatment of this
issue can be found in Emily Sherwin, Restitution and Equity: An Analysis of the Princi-
ple of Unjust Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REv. 2083 (2001) (discussing various definitions
of "equity" as related to law on unjust enrichment).
23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 1 cmt. b (Discussion Draft).
[Vol. 52: p. 487
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course.2 4 Similarly, the Restatement's conceptual formality is designed to
ensure that restitution follows precise deductive techniques that restrict
the imposition of judicial will on transacting parties.
3. Terminological Clean-Up
For all of the cheerleading for the coherent, positive view of restitu-
tion, deep confusion and uncertainty remain. Terminology in this area is
notoriously slippery and, considering the Restatement's definition, wildly
misleading. In ordinary usage, "restitution" means giving something back.
A thief who returns stolen property, money returned when a contract is
unwound, and returning money paid by mistake are all acts of restitution:
in each case the plaintiff is restored to his original position. 25 The Restate-
ment, however, posits that restitution is defined as unjust enrichment-a
principle that focuses exclusively on defendants' unjustified gains rather
than on plaintiffs' losses and desire for compensation. Upon further ex-
amination, however, "unjust enrichment" is only slightly more precise. 26
The term begs for an external baseline to assess the justness of a given
transaction. Indeed the Restatement notes that the favored locution is actu-
ally "unjustified enrichment,"2 7 a term borrowed from Roman law that
conveys that the transaction is unjustified as a matter of positive law rather
than resting on amorphous notions of morality and policy. Despite good
arguments for abandoning this terminology, the Restatement concludes
that "restitution" and "unjust enrichment" are too entrenched in the
American legal consciousness to be removed at this point. 28
Terminological reform extends beyond the main subject heading.
The Restatement collects numerous doctrines from all over the common law
landscape and locates them within the restitution/unjust enrichment
framework. By way of example, actions for recovery of payments remitted
under a mistake of fact have often been explained in terms of quasi con-
tract and money had and received. 29 Similarly, actions to reform or re-
write property deeds premised on mistakes (i.e. the deed records a
different parcel than buyer or seller agreed to exchange) are typically un-
24. See id. § 1 cmt. b ("In reality, the law of restitution is very far from impos-
ing liability for every instance of what might plausibly be called unjust enrich-
ment."); see also id. illus. 1-2.
25. See Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, supra note 16, at 1191-92.
26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 1 cmt. b (Discussion Draft).
27. Id. This is the term favored by many non-American restitution scholars.
See id. § 1 reporter's note b. A more complete account of these terms is available
in Francesco Giglio, A Systematic Approach to 'Unjust' and 'Unjustified' Enrichment, 23
Ox. J. LEGAL STUD. 455 (2003).
28. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 1 reporter's note b (Discus-
sion Draft). ("The term 'unjust enrichment' is too firmly fixed as the keystone of
American restitution to be replaced without harm to the structure. Given a free
choice, 'unjustified enrichment' might well be preferable.... ."); see also Kull, Ratio-
nalizing Restitution, supra note 16, at 1212-13.
29. See Banque Worms v. BankAmerica Int'l, 570 N.E.2d 189, 192 (N.Y. 1991).
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derstood as "actions in equity" appended to the law of property.30 The
Restatement resists this unprincipled classification based on the outmoded
forms of action or the jurisdictional quirks of the pre-modern common
law. Instead, it describes each of these doctrines as the law's response to
prevent unjust enrichment that would inevitably occur if no remedy was
offered.3 1
The law of restitution is thus comprised of a litany of doctrines going
under various names and guises. These include elements of quasi con-
tract, contract implied-in-law, quantum meruit, assumpsit, constructive
trust, replevin, equitable lien and subrogation, recession, reformation and
so on. 32 While the Restatement is quick to jettison this archaic terminology,
courts have not quite caught up.33 Most notably in this regard are refer-
ences to "equity," "quasi contract," "implied contract," "quantum meruit"
and "constructive trust," terms that the Restatement consciously omits but
that remain the operative terminology in most cases presenting unjust en-
richment issues.3 4
Surveying the literature on restitution in 1968, Professor Wade found
that the American Digest System (the precursor to the West Key System) had
no entry for "unjust enrichment," "quasi contract" or "restitution," and
that one had to look to more than twenty-five entries to cobble together
the rules that the Restatement presents as restitution.35 While in the suc-
ceeding years the situation has been somewhat ameliorated, the core of
his insight remains intact.
B. Restitution as Unjust Enrichment
The Restatement's guiding conceptual principle is:
[T] he law of restitution be defined exclusively in terms of its core
idea, the law of unjust enrichment. By this definition it would be
axiomatic (i) that no liability could be asserted in restitution
other than one referable to the unjust enrichment of the defen-
30. See, e.g., Wright v. Sampson, 830 N.E.2d 1022 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Worley
v. White Tire of Tenn., Inc., 182 S.W.3d 306 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005); see also RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 12 reporter's note
a (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001).
31. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 12
cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 1); see also id. § 6 illus. 2.
32. See, e.g., 1 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES §§ 4.2-4.3 (2d ed. 1993).
33. See, e.g., Fed. Ins. Co. v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., 415
F.3d 487 (6th Cir. 2005); Carthaginian Fin. Corp. v. Skinner, Inc., No. 2:05-CV-3,
2005 WL 1388689 (D. Vt. June 3, 2005); Morfin v. Estate of Martinez, 831 N.E.2d
791 (Ind. App. Ct. 2005); Jantzen Beach Assocs., LLC v. Jantzen Dynamic Corp.,
115 P.3d 943 (Or. Ct. App. 2005); Chorman v. McCormick, 172 S.W.3d 22 (Tex.
App. 2005).
34. See, e.g., PALMER, supra note 6, § 1.1 (Supp. 2006) (citing hundreds of
cases displaying terminological and conceptual confusion).
35. John Wade, The Literature of the Law of Restitution, 19 HAsTINGS L.J. 1087,
1097 (1968).
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dant, and (ii) that the measure of recovery in restitution must in
every case be the extent of the defendant's unjust enrichment.3 6
The insistence that unjust enrichment provides the basis for restitu-
tion is quite exacting. "In the absence of a benefit to the defendant, there
can be no liability in restitution; nor can the measure of liability in restitu-
tion exceed the measure of the defendant's enrichment." 37 Moreover,
"cases[ ] inconsistent [with these principles of restitution] will henceforth
require either a different rationale or a different result. 38
This approach does not have the support of leading scholars.3 9 Even
the first Restatement, in many ways the model for the latest incarnation,
takes a less dogmatic view, holding "a person who has been unjustly de-
prived of his property or its value or the value of his labor may be entitled
to maintain an action for restitution against another although the other has
not in fact been enriched thereby."40 This formulation has been repeated by
several courts41 and affords the possibility of restitution outside of unjust
enrichment. Similarly, standard compilations of black letter doctrine de-
fine restitution as "compensation, reimbursement, indemnification, or
reparation for benefits derived from, or for loss or injury caused to, another,"
which also runs contrary to the Restatement's theory.42
The disconnect between the Restatement and the law it purports to re-
state extends, however, beyond the term "restitution." Under the unified
scheme, quasi contract/quantum meruit present claims for unjust enrich-
36. Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, supra note 16, at 1196; see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 1 (Discussion Draft, 2000) ("A person who is unjustly
enriched at the expense of another is liable in restitution to the other."). For a
discussion of the evolution of the term "restitution," see supra notes 16-20 and
accompanying text.
37. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 2 cmt. d (Discussion Draft).
38. Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, supra note 16, at 1196-97.
39. See, e.g., DAGAN, supra note 6; Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of
Restitution, 67 TEx. L. REv. 1277 (1989) [hereinafter Laycock, Restitution]; Joseph
Perillo, Restitution in the Second Restatement of Contracts, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 37 (1981)
[hereinafter Perillo, Restitution in the Restatement]; Perillo, Restitution in a Contractual
Setting, supra note 9. In a different vein of disagreement, see Peter B. Birks, Misno-
mer, in RESTITUTION: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE (W.R. Cornish et al. eds., 1998); see
also Peter B. Birks, Unjust Enrichment and Wrongful Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REv. 1767,
1770 n.10 (2001) (citing IAN McNEIL JACKMAN, THE VARIETIES OF RESTITUTION
(1998) and GRAHAM VIRGO, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 6-16 (1st
ed. 1999) as disagreeing with unitary model).
40. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 1 cmt. e (1937) (emphasis
added).
41. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Gregori, 45 F.3d 1017 (6th Cir. 1995); Russell v.
Northrop Grumman Corp., 921 F. Supp. 143 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
42. 66 AM. JUR. 2D Restitution § 1 (2004) (emphasis added); see also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION ch. 1, introductory note (Tentative Draft No. 1,
1983) ("The central idea is the conjunction of unjust enrichment on the one side
and loss or grievance on the other.... [L]iability in restitution depend[s] in part
on the wrongful acquisition of gain and in part on [the] harm or loss wrongfully im-
posed." (emphasis added)).
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ment that do not depend on the presence of an actual (express) contract.
As several courts have pointed out, however, the very term "quantum me-
ruit" means "as much as he has deserved." 4 3 This orientation naturally
directs the court's thinking towards plaintiff's frustrated expectations
rather than defendant's enrichment.44 Further, the association with im-
plied contracts has led several courts to assert that a claim under quasi
contract requires a factual investigation as to whether plaintiff and defen-
dant acted in a manner as to imply a contract; a view at odds with the
Restatement's position that unjust enrichment creates obligations mandated
by law. 4 5 The Restatement assumes that these disagreements are only skin-
deep; that despite muddled terminology, courts essentially adhere to the
principles of restitution as unjust enrichment. As is often the case, how-
ever, terminological confusion belies a deeper confusion of ideas.4
6
Leading scholarship is also somewhat skeptical of the Restatement's as-
sumption that restitution can be reduced to precise and positive rules. To
many observers, the landscape of restitution is a vast expanse that lacks set
boundaries or fixed reference points. 4 7 One noted scholar has observed
that "[r]estitution is an unusually flexible body of case law ... enabling
judges and juries to consider many cases on their merits unhampered by
43. BLACK'S LAw DIcTiONARY 1255 (7th ed. 1999); see also Kashani v. Tsann
Kuen China Enter. Co., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 174, 193 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); Nextel S.
Corp. v. R.A. Clark Consulting, Ltd., 596 S.E.2d 416, 419 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004);
Ellerin & Assocs. v. Brawley, 589 S.E.2d 626, 629 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003); City of Misha-
waka v. Kvale, 810 N.E.2d 1129, 1136 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
44. Under Professor Kull's theory, quasi contract is a claim in unjust enrich-
ment that in no way depends on the existence of a contract. Courts, however,
often state that quasi contract/quantum meruit permits recovery on the basis of an
implied promise to be paid. See, e.g., Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. Nw. Pipeline
Corp., 979 P.2d 627, 640 (Idaho 1999). For a particularly muddled locution, see
Sack v. Tomlin, 871 P.2d 298, 302 (Nev. 1994) ("The doctrine of quantum meruit
generally applies to an action for restitution ... which is founded on an oral prom-
ise on the part of the defendant to pay the plaintiff as much as the plaintiff reason-
ably deserves .. "). For further examples regarding the confusion between unjust
enrichment and quantum meruit/quasi contract, see PALMER, supra note 6, § 1.1
n.3-4 (Supp. 2006). For a discussion of the Restatement's gerrymandering of bene-
fits in emergency services cases to maintain its conceptual modeling, see infra
notes 110-32 and accompanying text.
45. Such is the law in Maine. See Forrest Assocs. v. Passamaquoddy Tribe, 760
A.2d 1041, 1045 (Me. 2000) (stating that existence of quasi contract/quantum me-
ruit is question of fact held to discretion of trial court and reviewed for clear
error).
46. A quick perusal of the first fifty pages (the additions to § 1.1) of the latest
cumulative supplement to Palmer's The Law of Restitution demonstrates the depth
and breadth of the conceptual and terminological confusion surrounding restitu-
tion/unjust enrichment. See, e.g., PALMER, supra note 6, § 1.1 (Supp. 2006); id§ 1.1
(Supp. No. 2 2007).
47. Professor Doug Rendleman designates this perspective as the "broad view"
of restitution, which he contrasts with the narrow view. See Doug Rendleman, Com-
mon Law Restitution in the Mississippi Tobacco Settlement: Did the Smoke Get in Their
Eyes?, 33 GA. L. REv. 847, 887-89 (1999) [hereinafter Rendleman, Mississippi To-
bacco Settlement].
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doctrine. '48 A leading mid-twentieth century restitution scholar, John
Dawson, found that "the most obvious statement about the American law
of restitution is that it lacks any kind of system." 49 More contemporary
scholars note that "the law of restitution is characterized by a heavy depen-
dence on general principles,"50 and that "unjust enrichment is an indefin-
able idea in the same way that justice is indefinable."5 1 Similarly,
casebooks on restitution are really casebooks on remedies whose primary
topics are the mechanics and process of injunctions, declaratory judg-
ments, attorney's fees and calculation of damages. 5 2 This modeling (or
lack thereof) cuts against the rationalized conception and reinforces the
view that restitution is a remedy imposed by courts as circumstances man-
date, rather than a substantive source of rights courts are required to
enforce.53
C. Restitution and Tort
While nearly all restitution scholars agree that unjust enrichment
presents a substantive basis of liability, they disagree as to whether restitu-
tion also contains elements that are solely remedial-that is, remedies that
piggyback on other sources of common law liability, most typically tort and
48. Stewart Macaulay, Comment, Restitution in Context, 107 U. PA. L. REv.
1133, 1134 (1959).
49. JOHN P. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 111
(1951).
50. 1 DOBBS, supra note 32, § 4.1.
51. PALMER, supra note 6, § 1.1.
52. See, e.g., WEAVER ET AL., REMEDIES: CASES, PRACTICAL PROBLEMS AND EXER-
CISES (2004). Restitution is the fifth chapter in this book that discusses injunctions,
equitable remedies, declaratory judgment and issues in damages measurement. A
similar structure is found in SCHOENBROD ET AL., REMEDIES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
(3d ed. 2002). This book's main titles (in order) are: Injunctions, Declaratory
Judgments, Criminal and Civil Sanctions, Damages, Restitution, Collection of
MoneyJudgments, and Conduct of the Plaintiff and Attorney's Fees. Interestingly,
in their Note on Approaching Restitution Cases, the authors endorse the Restatement's
theory that restitution is a branch of the common law. See id. at 724-28. This dis-
cussion is relegated, nevertheless, to eighty pages of a roughly thousand page
casebook on remedies.
The situation is a bit more balanced in Douc RENDLEMAN, REMEDIES: CASES
AND MATERIALS (6th ed. 1999). Rendleman's chapter on "Unjust Enrichment-Resti-
tution," opens with a faithful recitation of the Restatement's orthodoxy, and the
book's organization stresses that restitution is a branch of substantive liability. See
id. at 313. Nevertheless, the discussion is situated in a casebook devoted to defin-
ing remedies delineated by other branches of private law. See id.
53. One can learn a lot about a doctrine from the company it keeps. As im-
plemented at the Harvard Law School Library, the Library of Congress classifica-
tion system places substantive restitution at KF 1244, between insurance law and
tort. But KF 1244 contains only the Restatement and Palmer's treatise on restitution
and Dagan's new book. The casebooks on remedies/restitution are classified as
remedies casebooks and placed at the tail end of the KF numbering scheme, sur-
rounded by works on attorney's fees, declaratory judgments, garnishments, federal
habeas practice and standards of appellate review.
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contract.54 The Restatement's position is unequivocal: restitution is purely
substantive. Anytime the law imposes a restitutionary remedy, the defen-
dant has necessarily been unjustly enriched.
An alternative view is presented by Professor Douglas Laycock. He
writes:
Restitution should.., be defined as that body of law in which (1)
substantive liability is based on unjust enrichment, (2) the mea-
sure of recovery is based on defendant's gain instead of plaintiff's
loss, or (3) the court restores to plaintiff, in kind, his lost property
or its proceeds. Restoration in kind includes remedies that re-
verse transactions, such as rescission.
5 5
For Laycock, restitution is an amalgamation of two distinct legal concepts,
one substantive (like contract and tort) and the other remedial (method
to recover damages). 56 "Both usages are part of any complete definition
of restitution." 57 Specific restitution (the remedial element) is "part of
the core concept of restitution" that is "conceptually equal to the avoid-
ance of unjust enrichment."5 8
In Laycock's account, if a thief steals $100 and through shrewd invest-
ing converts it into $500, the plaintiff's substantive claim is liability for
conversion of the $100 in tort. Because getting back $500 is more attrac-
tive than the mere return of the $100, however, plaintiff will opt for resti-
tution as his remedy for the tort. The same is true where plaintiff elects
"rescission and restitution" as the remedy for a breach of contract claim.
The typical case is where the prospective seller of goods rescinds the con-
tract, only to find that the market value of the goods at the time of trial is
lower than when the contract was formed. In this case, the plaintiff will
want to rewind the transaction to the status quo ante and receive his initial
purchase price rather than the price of the now-devalued goods. In these
cases restitution has no independent substantive basis, but simply serves as
plaintiff's elected remedy for liability generated in tort and contract.
Professor Kull's main criticism of Laycock is that the "core concept"
of restitution is comprised of two conceptually incommensurate parts, one
substantive and the other remedial, and that Laycock's position "obscures
the underlying unity of restitution's reason and function across all of its
factual settings."59 Rather, Professor Kull argues that every case of conver-
54. Compare, e.g., 1 DOBBS, supra note 32, § 4.1(2) (outlining substantive side
of restitution), with id. § 4.1 (4) (describing remedial side of restitution), and PETER
BIRKs & ROBERT CHAMBERS, THE RESTITUTION RESEARCH RESOURCE vii (1994).
55. Laycock, Restitution, supra note 39, at 1293.
56. Subpart (1) is substantive and largely tracks Kull's views. Subpart (3) is
remedial and is the source of the Kull/Laycock disagreement. Laycock is unclear
as to how subpart (2) fits in. It seems to straddle both categories. See id. at 1285-90.
57. Id. at 1279.
58. Id. at 1280.
59. Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, supra note 16, at 1216, 1226.
[Vol. 52: p. 487
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol52/iss3/3
20071 RESTITUTION & CONCEPTUALISM
sion results in the emergence of two separate bases of liability: one in tort
and the other in restitution.6 0 While the labeling is irrelevant in most
cases (since plaintiff gets his $100 back in any event), where disgorgement
of further profits is available, plaintiff is actually suing in restitution. The
commitment to presenting restitution as a coequal branch of the common
law forces Kull to argue that restitution is in play in every conversion case,
even though the litigants and courts focus exclusively on tort elements.
6 1
The response to Laycock's restitution-as-remedy for contract argu-
ment is simpler. The Restatement claims that it is a mistake (facilitated by
the imprecision of the term restitution) 62 to assume that the remedy titled
"rescission and restitution" has anything to do with the branch of the com-
mon law dealing with restitution/unjust enrichment. 63 Returning the
purchase price to the non-breaching plaintiff is simply a remedy for con-
tract, just as replevin is a remedy for tort. Because there is no conceptual
or analytical connection to unjust enrichment, instances of rescission and
restitution are understood as purely contractual remedies. Their inclu-
sion in the Restatement of Restitution is simply a concession to conventional
parlance.
64
D. Restitution and Contract
Fundamentally, restitution's goal of unwinding transactions runs di-
rectly counter to the central aim of contract law-the enforcement of
promised exchanges. At the theoretical level, one of the Restatement's cen-
tral goals is to distinguish restitution from contract. In fact, when com-
60. See id. at 1225-26; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UN-
JUST ENRICHMENT ch. 5, introductory note (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005).
61. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT ch. 5,
introductory note (Tentative Draft No. 4); Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, supra note
16, at 1225.
62. In Kull's own words, "[t]he confusion surrounding the equivocal mean-
ings of the word 'restitution' is at its most dense in the present context." RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT ch. 4, topic 2, introductory
note (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2004).
63. Despite Professor Kull's rejection of the idea that these contract remedies
are related to the "true" law of restitution, as the Reporter to the Restatement (Third)
he does not feel comfortable excluding these doctrines, and thus they appear as
Sections 37-38 in Tentative Draft No. 3. Their inclusion is ultimately justified by the
fact that "readers will look for these rules in a Restatement of Restitution," and a
"candid ... acknowledge[ment] that we have inherited an imperfect terminology."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT ch. 4, topic 2, in-
troductory note (Tentative Draft No. 3).
64. See Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, supra note 16, at 1219-22; see also RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT ch. 4, introductory note
(Tentative Draft No. 3). This view is hardly uncontroversial. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 344-45, 373 cmt. a (1979); id. at ch. 16, topic 4, intro-
ductory note; Andrew Kull, Disgorgement for Breach, the "Restitution Interest", 79 TEX.
L. REv. 2021, 2029-44 (2001) (analyzing disagreement between Professor Kull and
Restatement (Second) of Contracts regarding classification of restitution as remedy for
breach of contract).
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pared to English and other Commonwealth accounts of restitution, the
defining feature of the Restatement's presentation is its effort to distinguish
restitution from contract and show how the two bodies of law can coexist
and even reinforce each other.65 Thus, the Restatement writes: "Where a
benefit is conferred within the framework of a valid and enforceable con-
tract, the recipient's liability to make compensation is fixed exclusively by
the contract." 66 Similarly, "[c]ontract is incomparably superior to restitu-
tion as a means of regulating most voluntary transfers because it elimi-
nates, or minimizes, the fundamental difficulty of valuation."6 7 Hence,
"[c]jonsiderations ofjustice as well as efficiency require, therefore, that vol-
untary transfers be made pursuant to contract whenever reasonably possi-
ble." 68 In the Restatement, unjust enrichment is a backup ground of
liability that melts away in the face of a valid contract.
Under the Restatement's view, contract and restitution are like oil and
water. As Professor Kull writes:
[W]here a benefit is conferred pursuant to a valid contract, the
presence or absence of unjust enrichment-the starting point of
analysis in restitution-can only be determined by reference to
the parties' bargain. Because a voluntary agreement fixes the
baseline of enrichment as between the parties, the existence of a
valid contract to govern a particular transaction normally estab-
lishes a boundary beyond which liability in restitution cannot
extend.69
This view works its way into the black letter rule of section two, which
finds that "transactions that give rise to liability in restitution ... take place
outside the framework of an enforceable contract, or otherwise without the effec-
tive consent of one or both parties."70 The Restatement's solution is a clas-
65. See Mark Gergen, Restitution and Contract: Reflections on the Third Restate-
ment, 13 RESTITUTION L. REv. 224, 224-25 (2004) [hereinafter Gergen, Restitution
and Contract] (noting that Restatement's commitment to independence of contract
law and its preference over restitution claims is significantly stronger than position
of Peter Birks and other leading commonwealth scholars); Steve Hedley, Restitu-
tion: Contract's Twin, in FAILURE OF CONTRACTS 247, 272 n.136 (Francis Rose ed.,
1997) (pointing out that Professor Kull from amongst all restitution scholars insists
on primacy of contract over restitution); see also Andrew Kull, Restitution and the
Noncontractual Transfer, 11 J. CoNT. L. 93 (1997) [hereinafter Kull, Restitution and
the Noncontractual Transfer].
66. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 2 cmt. c (Discussion Draft, 2000).
"[T]he application of restitution principles to contractual exchanges is exclusively
to the consequences of performance under ineffective or interrupted agree-
ments." Id.
67. Id. § 2 cmt. f.
68. Id.
69. Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, supra note 16, at 1200.
70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 2(2) (Discussion Draft) (empha-
sis added). Comment c adds:
[The] absence of agreement, or lack of effective consent to the transac-
tion by one or both parties, furnishes the common analytical theme unit-
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sic expression of the will theory of contract. 71 Unjust enrichment must be
unjust. If the parties agreed (contracted) to the transaction, however, it is
by definition just, thus affording plaintiff no claim in restitution. 72
The Restatement uses the contract/no contract divide to explain a
number of results. For example Section 5 (invalidating mistake) presents
several scenarios, two of which are repeated here. In Case 1:
A's life is insured with B Company for $5,000. C is the named
beneficiary. The body of a shipwreck victim is officially identified
as that of A. Neither B nor C questions the accuracy of the iden-
tification. On receipt of formal proof of A's death, B pays C
$5,000. A is later discovered alive. B's payment is the result of
invalidating mistake .... 73
In Case 2:
Same facts as [Case 1], except that B agrees to pay $1,500 now, to
be retained by C in any event, with the balance of $3,500 in two
years' time if A has not subsequently reappeared. Shortly after
B's initial payment to C, A is discovered alive. The terms of the
transaction constitute an express allocation between the parties
of the risk that payment under the policy is not in fact due. B's
payment of $1,500 to C is not the result of invalidating mistake as
defined [in the Restatement]. 7
This distinction is justified because in Case 2 "[t] he terms of the trans-
action constitute an express allocation between the parties of the risk that
payment under the policy is in fact not due."75 While Case 1 affords B a
claim in restitution, the parties' contracted-for-settlement precludes resti-
tution in Case 2.
Despite the intuitive appeal of this thesis, it is difficult to sustain. It
assumes that a clear line demarcates enforceable, "live" contracts-when
restitution must take a back seat-from "dead," frustrated, discharged, or
unformed contracts-where restitution applies in full force. The difficul-
ties with this distinction are legion, including nearly every variation of the
ing the principal headings of liability in restitution.... Where a benefit
is conferred within the framework of a valid and enforceable contract,
the recipient's liability to make compensation is fixed exclusively by the
contract .... [T]he application of restitution principles to contractual
exchanges is exclusively to the consequences of performance under inef-
fective or interrupted agreements. These are transactions in which the
defendant's liability to pay for a performance actually received has not
been specified by a contract that is both valid and enforceable.
71. Id. cmt. c (citations omitted). The will theory of contract is developed
and discussed in KENNEDY, supra note 9, at 212-34.
72. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) Or RESTITUTION § 2 illus. 1 (Discussion Draft).
73. Id. § 5 illus. 3.
74. Id. § 5 illus. 4.
75. Id.
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venerable flagpole hypothetical (where A promises B $100 to reach the
top of the flagpole).76 Under orthodox contract doctrine, the law as-
sumes that A bargained for B to reach the top of the flagpole, not for B to
exert considerable effort on the way up. The recurring question is what
happens if A repudiates the contract before B reaches the top. While the
facts come in many guises-authors contracted to write books that are
never published,77 stonemasons employed to carve statutes that are not
completed,78 and architects retained to draw up plans that are never
used-recovery is typically allowed. 79 Yet, whether these claims are under-
stood as breach of contract, promissory estoppel, reliance, quantum me-
ruit, restitution, implied or constructive contract has never been
completely worked out.80 The line between the classic enforceable con-
tract and a host of peripheral contract-like remedies is far blurrier than
the Restatement seems willing to admit.8 1
Perhaps the greatest source of confusion results from trying to distin-
guish between reliance (based on plaintiffs loss) and restitution (based
on defendant's unjust gain) claims.8 2 Both of these theories go under the
76. This view is critiqued in HEDLEY, supra note 6, at 55-84.
77. See John P. Dawson, Restitution Without Enrichment, 61 B.U. L. REv. 563,
578-80 (1981) (citing Planche v. Colburn, 131 Eng. Rep. 305 (1831)).
78. See id. at 563, 577, 580-81 (citing Dowling v. McKinney, 124 Mass. 478
(1878)).
79. See id. at 582 & n.51 (citing Hunter v. Vicario, 130 N.Y.S. 625 (1911); Ste-
phen v. Camden and Phila. Soap Co., 75 N.J.L. 648 (1907)).
80. Compare Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, supra note 16, at 1207 (arguing
these cases should be understood as contract and reliance claims), with Dawson,
supra note 77, at 577-85 (claiming these actions include restitution), and Perillo,
Restitution in the Restatement, supra note 39, at 38-41.
81. Similar difficulties are raised in the pre-contractual context. Suppose in
the course of negotiating a deal, A discloses an idea or business plan to B, which B
then uses to his advantage. Does A have a claim against B? Does it arise in restitu-
tion, as a tort for misappropriation of property, or is it a breach of an express or
implied contract? Does it matter whether the underlying transaction is ultimately
consummated? Whether the idea qualified as a trade secret? Would the result
change if the deal was for A to license the idea to B; or whether the parties contem-
plated a sale of a business division unit employing the designated plan? See E.
Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and
Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 217, 225-40 (1987). Mark Gergen touches on
these difficulties, but defends the Restatement's position in Gergen, Restitution and
Contract, supra note 65, at 238-40.
82. The Restatement's discussion of the relationship between these doctrines is
fairly limited. A typical expression of the approach is set out in RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 31 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No.
3, 2004). This note provides in part:
This Section describes a liability based on the unjust enrichment of the
recipient of the claimant's contractual performance. Restitution has
sometimes been invoked to award what is more readily understood as a
species of reliance damages: compensation for losses incurred in per-
forming (or preparing to perform) an unenforceable contract, notwith-
standing the absence of benefit to the defendant as a result of the
plaintiff's expenditure. The more straightforward account of these out-
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guise of "quasi contract,"8 3 a term that itself generates confusion between
contracts implied-in-law, which imply restitution,84 and contracts implied-
in-fact, which imply reliance.85 Ransacking the case law is unlikely to pro-
duce a clear dividing line between these two ideas.8 6 A less conceptualistic
approach would therefore place less emphasis on doctrinal pigeonholes
and more frankly discuss how courts routinely eschew doctrinal niceties to
obtain just results for the parties. 87 What remains clear, however, is that
the line between "dead" and "live" contracts is far too manipulable to be of
use in demarcating the bounds between recoveries based on the will of the
parties and those based on the will of the state.
88
III. THE IMMANENT RATIONALITY OF RESTITUTION
The Restatement's assumption that law can be made to cohere around
a principle of unjust enrichment is a subset of a more general view regard-
comes describes them in terms of promissory liability, not as restitution
based on unjust enrichment.
Id.; see also id. reporter's notes; id. § 23, cmt. c; id. § 26 illus. 16 (providing demon-
stration of practical difference between reliance and restitution claims).
83. Compare, e.g., Ver Brycke v. Ver Brycke, 843 A.2d 758, 772 n.9 (Md. 2004)
(noting that promissory estoppel is "quasi contract" claim), with Wingert & Assoc's.
v. Paramount Apparel Int'l, Inc., No. 03-6451ADMAJB, 2005 WL 1355028, at *5 (D.
Minn. June 7, 2005) (" [U]njust enrichment claims are typically 'quasi contract'
claims.").
84. Kelly v. Levandoski contains a typically confusing expression of this ap-
proach. There, the court held that:
Even if there is no express contract, a plaintiff may sometimes recover
under the theory of unjust enrichment, which is also called quantum me-
ruit, contract implied-in-law, constructive contract, or quasi contract.
These theories are legal fictions invented by the common law courts in
order to permit recovery where in fact there is no true contract, but
where, to avoid unjust enrichment, the courts permit recovery of the
value of the services rendered just as if there had been a true contract.
825 N.E.2d 850, 860 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (citation and internal quotations
omitted).
85. See 6 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2580 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2004) ("A contract implied
in fact requires the same elements as an express contract and differs only in the
method of expressing mutual assent.").
86. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 97 (1995) (noting that
quasi contract [restitution] and reliance are "twins" and that "it would seem, as a
matter ofjurisprudential economy, that both situations could have been dealt with
under either slogan, but the legal mind has always preferred multiplication to divi-
sion"); Linzer, supra note 6, at 699 (arguing that there is no clear line between
restitution and reliance).
87. See, e.g., DouCLAs LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND
MATERIALS 634-35 (2002) (suggesting differences between promissory estoppel and
restitution, but concluding that all remedies in cases of partially performed puta-
tive contracts are contract claims under various labels and should be analyzed as
such).
88. See Hedley, supra note 65, at 250-59 (criticizing mainstream restitution
scholarship for adopting "Victorian" model of contract law). But see Gergen, Resti-
tution and Contract, supra note 65, at 238-40.
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ing the "immanent rationality of the law."8 9 This in turn rests on three
related assumptions: first, that the law coheres; second, that it coheres
around distinctly legal principles; and finally, that the lack of coherent
and organizing principles is a defect in the legal regime.
A. Where Do Legal Concepts Come From?
At the heart of conceptualism lies a concept-an idea that both de-
scribes the legal field and provides a normative framework for future deci-
sions. Less clear is where this concept comes from and why its
proscriptions are binding on future courts. Conceptualists rarely confront
this question openly, often relying on a less-than-fully-articulated fusion of
descriptive observations and normative claims.90 Nevertheless, a basic pat-
tern emerges. If scholars can demonstrate that a certain concept is im-
plicit in past decisions (even if the courts were unaware of it), that
concept, once articulated, becomes binding on future decisions.
91
The creation of the Restatement's "principle of unjust enrichment" fol-
lows a similar pattern. Legal analysis begins with case law. Courts decide
cases under a variety of rationales, some deemed correct (recovery based
on unjust enrichment), and some deemed incorrect (recovery based on
constructive notice). 92 A review of a line of cases reveals a recurring ana-
lytical pattern, often different from the reasoning or language employed
by the court itself. Legal scholars, however, recognize that these principles
offer a more accurate account of what is "really" going on in decisional law
than whatever the courts themselves say. Subsequently, a large number of
cases are brought together and made to cohere around these new princi-
ples, creating a "field," "body" or "area" of law. At approximately this
point, the project becomes normative. Going forward, courts are com-
mended to abandon the old rationales and frame their decisions in terms
of the new unifying principles or concepts. Eventually, conceptualist
89. Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97
YALE L.J. 949 (1988).
90. Kull himself says very little on the topic. His views about the origins of the
law of restitution are limited to the following:
Disagreement at this basic level about the content of the law of torts or
the law of contracts would be unthinkable-not because these subjects
have an immanent or ideal form (any more than restitution does), but
because they have acquired stable conventional definitions (as restitution
has yet to do). The nineteenth-century treatise writers defined bodies of
law called "torts" and "contracts" that lawyers came to regard as appropri-
ate, because the subjects as defined lent themselves to fruitful analysis
and analogy.
Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, supra note 16, at 1194.
91. See Gordley, supra note 1, at 1817-21 (describing process through which
common law concepts are created and applied).
92. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 12 reporter's note (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001) (listing cases where property
deeds are reformed based on fictional theory of constructive notice are more cor-
rectly described as cases that prevent unjust enrichment).
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scholars can point to cases (both past and present) that do not fit analytic
schemes and declare them "wrongly decided."
This type of argument, the most classic of the classical legal period, is
as intuitive as it is debated.93 It assumes that somehow, despite the well-
documented irrationalities and misunderstandings that beleaguer the law
of restitution, a coherent whole-the principle of unjust enrichment-
successfully emerges. Neither the misunderstood distinction between law
and equity, nor the numerous fictions used to administer the common
counts in assumpsit, nor bungling the contract implied-in-law/implied-in-
fact distinction, nor the terminological confusion surrounding restitution,
unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, quasi contract, constructive contract,
constructive trust, etc. were able to prevent the common law's invisible
hand from achieving an underlying coherence. Additionally, the concep-
tualist's merger of descriptive and normative claims generates a tricky
chicken-and-egg problem. On the one hand, the concept is derived from
the cases. Validity comes from the concept's ability to explain a body of
positive case law. On the other hand, once the concept is identified and
established, it can be used to critique decided cases and find them wrongly
decided. But if the cases generate the concept, how can it be used as a
benchmark to accept or reject decided cases?
B. Unitary Concepts
To understand the Restatement's conceptualism, it is useful to compare
its view of restitution with the analysis offered by Professor Laycock. Lay-
cock is undoubtedly a conceptualist, whose avowed purpose is to bring
order and coherence to the body of restitution cases. 94 Unlike the Restate-
93. The literature on its contentiousness is legion. The most famous Ameri-
can critic of the immanent rationality approach is Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
in Oliver Wendell Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS
117 (1920). See also Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv.
457 (1897) (questioning theory of immanent rationality). Jeremy Bentham was
probably the most vociferous critic. See GERALD PosTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COM-
MON LAW TRADITION 263-301 (1986) (surveying Bentham's criticism of immanent
rationality). The anti-conceptualist tradition probably has its roots in the works of
Rudolph von Jhering, a leading German conceptualist scholar who turned his back
on conceptual jurisprudence and became the first proto-realist. Duncan Kennedy
has credited the French philosopher Rene Demogue with pioneering the idea that
law is a series of compromises between conflicting social goals (conflicting consid-
erations) rather than a collection of elegant legal concepts. See Duncan Kennedy,
From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller's "Consideration and
Form", 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 111-15 (2000) [hereinafter Kennedy, Will Theory].
As for its intuitive nature, virtually every brief submitted to an appellate court
argues that several precedent cases create a "doctrine" or "framework" that applies
to the case at bar. For a recent scholarly defense, see generally Stephen A. Smith,
Taking Law Seriously, 50 U. TORONTO L.J. 241 (2000) (defending doctrinal and
conceptual scholarship).
94. See Laycock, Restitution, supra note 39, at 1277. Laycock writes:
This Essay offers a conceptual and practical overview of the field. First, I
attempt to define the concept of restitution, its principal subdivisions,
and its boundaries with other bodies of law. Second, I attempt to identify
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ment, however, Laycock does not assume that the law of restitution must
cohere under a single unifying principle.9 5 This seemingly technical dis-
tinction highlights salient differences in these conflicting views of restitu-
tion, and of conceptualism more generally.
According to Laycock, restitution is comprised of several separate ba-
ses of liability. In addition to the substantive elements, Laycock finds a
purely remedial component.9 6 This conceptual framing has its roots in
the writings of late nineteenth century theorists and remains a common
form of post-realist conceptualism. 9 7 The classical tort writers, for exam-
ple, were unable to reconcile the whole of tort law under a single, unitary
principle. 98 Instead, they divided the law into "core" and "peripheral"
components. Negligence was said to be the core, while strict liability doc-
trines (that could not fit into the negligence paradigm) were shunted to
the periphery. The core/periphery technique advanced two important
goals. On the one hand, marginalization of "errant" doctrines made it
possible to describe the core of tort law in terms of negligence, ensuring
that future development tended towards negligence rather than strict lia-
bility. At the same time, however, the peripheral doctrines eliminated the
need to shoehorn strict liability holdings into a negligence framework.
The peripheral category saved the classical theorists the work of trying to
fit a round peg into a square hole, making the overall doctrinal structure
less complex and more compelling. 9 9
The Restatement's principle author, Professor Kull, however, finds Lay-
cock's theory incoherent, claiming that restitution cannot be "an apple
and an orange," 10 0 consisting of a substantive basis of liability and a group
of remedies for other causes of action. Analytically this argument makes
good sense, but the insistence on conceptual unity has its costs, as casuistry
is the price one pays for analytic coherence. When a thief steals $100,
and classify the principal situations in which restitution is of practical and
not just theoretical interest.
Id.
95. For a discussion of Laycock's theory of restitution, see supra notes 55-64
and accompanying text.
96. See Laycock, Restitution, supra note 39, at 1277-78 (discussing components
of restitution).
97. See Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law: An Essay in
Deconstruction, 36 STAN. L. REV. 623, 628-30 (1984) (describing core/periphery mo-
dality as mode of formalism that takes account of realist critiques).
98. See, e.g., FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS 1-21 (1887). A similar
methodology was used by Justice Holmes in The Theory of Torts, 7 Am. L. REV 652
(1873) (attributed to Holmes in 2 MARK DEWOLFE HowE, JusTICE OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES 81 (1963), and in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 82-163
(1881)).
99. Thus Pollock avoided having to justify why the common carrier is subject
to absolute liability while most other hires are judged under the negligence stan-
dard. Pollock simply claims that common carrier liability is anomalous or periph-
eral to the main line of tort law, i.e. negligence. See POLLOCK, supra note 98, at 17-
21.
100. Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, supra note 16, at 1216.
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Professor Kull argues that liability in restitution emerges coequally with
liability in tort, even though it has never been thought that conversion has
anything to do with unjust enrichment. 10 ' The purposes of this posited
parallel track of restitution are to maintain conceptual unity and to show
that restitution will emerge whenever a causative event occurs.
The rejection of the core/periphery model is closely connected to the
justificatory work performed by the conceptual account of liability in resti-
tution. The existence of peripheral doctrines means that the law cannot
be fully rationalized in conceptual-analytic terms, a fact that significantly
reduces the descriptive and normative strength of the conceptualist's
claim. Descriptively, peripheral doctrines mean that legal concepts do not
offer a complete explanation of the case law because factors other than
analytic purity, including the common law's tortured history, precedent,
'Justice concerns," and political and economic motivations, all impact le-
gal outcomes.10 2 This, in turn, weakens the normative claim. To the ex-
tent that every case can be shown to fit into a single doctrinal structure, its
normative claim is considerable. Thus, if unjust enrichment explains
every restitution case, it is easy to see why non-conforming decisions are
thought to be wrongly decided. If unjust enrichment is, however, simply a
convenient way to explain many, but not all, restitution cases, then non-
conforming rules can simply be described as peripheral. Moreover, the
core/periphery model encourages seemingly irresolvable debates as to
what should be characterized as periphery and what should be character-
ized as core. How should each of these categories be measured? Quan-
titatively or qualitatively? Finally, at what point does the periphery swallow
up the core?10 3
As competing bases proliferate, the normative appeal of the unitary
concept becomes proportionally weaker. A conclusion that there are sev-
eral "headings" of restitution is a conclusion that "restitution" has no ana-
lytical content at all. If the case law sustains three headings, what prevents
future cases from creating four or five headings, or even as many headings
as there are cases? This is the conclusion reached by the classical
realists.' 0 4
101. For a discussion of Kull's theories, see supra notes 59-61 and accompany-
ing text. Professor Kull goes to great lengths to claim that returning stolen prop-
erty is unrelated to restitution as unjust enrichment. See, e.g., Kull, Rationalizing
Restitution, supra note 16, at 1191-93.
102. For example, Pollock concluded that the strict liability standard gov-
erning "torts to possession and property" cannot be explained through any ra-
tional or analytic justification but that it is a function of the tortured history of the
common law's writ system. See POLLOCK, supra note 98, at 14-16.
103. An example is the debate between Mark Gergen and Steve Hedley as to
whether the multiplicity of "peripheral" contract doctrines renders its "core"
meaningless. See Gergen, Restitution and Contract, supra note 65, at 238-40. The
debates surrounding Grant Gilmore's The Death of Contract offer another pertinent
example.
104. In discussing Hoefeld's critique of classical legal thought, Duncan Ken-
nedy stated several times that once it is admitted that property is a bundle of sever-
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C. The Source of Liability
In the conceptualist view, every instance of liability must be justified
under a distinct analytical basis. While each basis of liability is theoreti-
cally self-contained, in reality, the borders prove to be far more porous
and result in multiple overlapping bases. As a result, conceptualist writers
expend considerable effort tending the garden of legal concepts, ensuring
that each analytic department remains coherent enough to serve itsjustifi-
catory purpose.
Take, for example, the discussion about the interaction between con-
tract and restitution. The Restatement views these concepts as mutually ex-
clusive and operating in distinct spheres, so that restitution emerges only
when the contract fails. 10 5 But cases where the contract fails because of
frustration of purpose or change of circumstances (Restatement Section
34), or when a dispute arises after one party has engaged in partial per-
formance (Restatement Section 35) amply demonstrate that whether the
remedy is under "contract" or "restitution" is no simple matter.10 6 Are
these cases of live, i.e. operative, contracts in need of restructuring and
rehabilitation, or are they contracts that died due to disputes regarding
performance obligations? 0
7
able sticks, the idea that property is a coherent analytic concept is dead. Accord
Duncan Kennedy, Private Law Theory, Lecture at Harvard Law School (Spring
2005).
This view is also currently held by Steve Hedley. See Hedley, supra note 65, at
251 (suggesting that restitution has "20 or more heads of liability" and that "the
case for the theory to unite restitution has not been made").
105. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 2 cmt. c (Discussion Draft, 2000) ("Where a benefit is conferred within the
framework of a valid and enforceable contract, the recipient's liability to make
compensation is fixed exclusively by the contract .... [T]he application of restitu-
tion principles to contractual exchanges is exclusively to the consequences of per-
formance under ineffective or interrupted agreements.").
106. For a discussion of restitution and contract, see supra notes 65-88 and
accompanying text. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 34 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2004). The Restatement creates a
sharp divide between contract and restitution, noting that in the case of a partially
completed contract, "the claimant has conferred a benefit at the request of the
defendant, without obtaining the promised exchange; enforcement of the contract
is unavailable, in this case, because the parties' obligations have been discharged.
The claimant's recourse is a claim measured in restitution by the defendant's net
enrichment." Id. Admittedly, one paragraph earlier the Restatement indicated that
both obligations can coexist, stating "[i]f the obligation has been partially or
wholly performed, the same challenge to the transaction presents what is simulta-
neously a question of contract and a question of restitution." Id. In any event, the
overall structure of the Restatement, especially the insistence that restitution arises
only when contract fails, leads me to discount this latter remark.
107. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT ch.
4, topic 2, introductory note (Tentative Draft No. 3) (noting disagreement be-
tween Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Restatement (Second) of Contracts regarding
relationship between restitution and contract).
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The goal, of course, is not to determine when a contract dies and
restitution is born. Neither actually happens and the legal imagination is
creative enough to issue death and birth certificates at a number of rele-
vant junctures, particularly if enough money rides on the decision. The
Restatement's artificial discourse regarding the life cycle of a contract is an
inevitable byproduct of its conceptual account.
While the Restatement assumes that remedies ranging from strict en-
forcement of contractual provisions to those arising under the headings of
reliance, estoppel, restitution, unjust enrichment, quasi contract and
quantum meruit can be neatly categorized as stemming from contract, re-
liance or restitution, little in the case law supports this. A more realist
account finds an ad hoc process whereby courts use a variety of remedies
in an attempt to salvage a relationship gone sour;10 8 especially where dis-
putes arise midstream (as in Section 35).109 The conceptualist finds such
untheorized recoveries unpalatable, as each remedy-granting decision
must fit into some larger category of pre-theorized liability.
D. Gerrymandered Concepts
Conceptualism has its advantages. It promises a vision of law that is
unified, predictable and rational. It also, however, has its costs. To main-
tain the precision, the conceptualist must gerrymander a host of sub-doc-
trines to make them fit into the larger theory. While the law's gray areas
can be rerouted and repackaged, they cannot be avoided. The promise of
clean and precise legal doctrine is never fully realized.
The Restatement's chief objective is to ground restitution in unjust en-
richment-defendant's gain rather than plaintiff's loss. But there is more
than one way to measure defendant's gain, a fact that has generated con-
siderable complexity. 110 The simplest application of the Restatement's the-
108. See, e.g., Hill v. Waxberg, 237 F.2d 936, 938-39 (9th Cir. 1956) (noting
confusion between contract implied in law and implied in fact); see also Farns-
worth, supra note 81, at 233 n.51 (noting how restitution and reliance claims are
often interchangeable) (citing Burridge v. Ace Storm Window Co., 69 Pa. D. & C.
184, 187 (C.P. 1949), as a pertinent example). In the scholarly literature, the obvi-
ous citation is L.L. Fuller and William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936). In general, this article is credited with framing
off-contract remedies in terms of reliance rather than restitution. See Kennedy,
Will Theory, supra note 93, at 156.
109. See, e.g., Farash v. Sykes Datatronics, Inc., 452 N.E.2d 1245, 1248 (N.Y.
1983). The court held:
We should not be distracted by the manner in which a theory of recovery
is titled. ... Whether denominated "acting in reliance" or "restitution" all
concur that a promisee who partially performs... at a promisor's request
should be allowed to recover the fair and reasonable value of the per-
formance rendered, regardless of the enforceability of the original
agreement.
Id. See generally DouctAs LAYCOCK, supra note 87, at 629-37..
110. See, e.g., Doug Rendleman, Quantum Meruit for the Subcontractor: Has Resti-
tution Jumped Off Dawson's Dock?, 79 TEX. L. REv. 2055, 2076-79 (2001) (presenting
at least four different ways to measure unjust enrichment).
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ory would apply a single metric across all restitution/unjust enrichment
claims. For instance, the approach taken in mistaken benefit cases is
rather intuitive; it measures unjust enrichment in terms of the net gain to
defendant's wealth.
Illustration 2 to Section 9 of the Restatement details: A Railroad delivers
a carload of coal to B that was intended for C. A regularly delivers a simi-
lar grade of coal to B, so that B is unaware of the mistake. The market
value of the coal is $10 per ton, but under a long-term contract, B pays
only $8 per ton for all its coal needs. B is liable in restitution to A, but only
at $8 per ton. 1 1'
This case presents a clear demonstration of restitution anchored in
defendant's gain rather than plaintiff's loss: "Neither market value, nor
cost to the provider, reveals the value to the recipient where the transfer is
nonconsensual."1 2 Taking this theory one step further, the Restatement
notes that in a case where the recipient lacks resources or liquidity to
purchase the uncontracted-for services, restitution may be assessed at even
less than the value of the true enrichment. 113 These rules take defen-
dant's personalized circumstances into account and focus on the precise
measure of defendant's gain, while completely ignoring issues pertaining
to plaintiffs loss. Section 9 Illustration 2 makes a compelling case for res-
titution as unjust enrichment.
The Restatement's theory becomes more difficult in other scenarios.
Section 20 deals with the provision of emergency medical services. Illus-
tration 1 presents the case of Dr. A, who is summoned to aid B, an uncon-
scious victim. Although Dr. A performs all necessary medical treatment
with due care, B fails to regain consciousness and dies. The Restatement
rules that Dr. A is entitled to restitution in the amount of his reasonable
customary charge for similar services. 114
The Restatement is aware of the shift from actual benefits in Section 9
(the coal case) to a fictional presumption about benefits in Section 20 (the
doctor's case), noting that "[s]ervices that are medically necessary are pre-
sumed to be beneficial without regard to the ultimate outcome"'1 5 and,
further, that "the measure of benefit to the recipient... is the reasonable
and customary charge for such services." 116 But framing this decision in
terms of the patient's unjust enrichment is simply unconvincing.' 17 First,
111. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 9
illus. 2 (Discussion Draft, 2000). This illustration is based on Mich. Cent. R. Co. v.
State, 155 N.E. 50 (Ind. Ct. App. 1927).
112. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 9 cmt.
d (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001).
113. See id.
114. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 20
illus. 1 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002).
115. Id. § 20 cmt. c (emphasis added).
116. Id.
117. Professor Kull defends this rule in his scholarly writings, but the explana-
tion there is hardly more convincing. See Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, supra note
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as in nearly every quantum meruit scenario, benefit is measured in terms
of Dr. A's charge rather than B's gain. Moreover, since B never regained
consciousness, it is difficult to determine what benefit was received. Com-
mentators have described the benefit in this case as "fictional,"11 8 as bene-
fit moves from an individualized inquiry into the realm of legal
presumptions.'1 9 But in order to square this result with the theory of resti-
tution as unjust enrichment, the Restatement must gerrymander the defini-
tion of benefit to encompass Dr. A's failed rescue attempt.
120
Beyond relying on fictional assumptions, the Restatement's insistence
on the unified theory requires the Restatement to gerrymander the tradi-
tional borders of restitution. Frustration of purpose cases provide another
example.
The coronation cases, which dealt with the fallout from the cancella-
tion of coronation ceremonies for King Edward VII in 1904, offer text-
book examples of frustration of purpose. The central question was
whether persons who had rented rooms and barges at coronation-only
rates along the processional path would be required to pay the contract
price to watch a parade that would not occur. While some of the original
cases found for the vendors, 12 ' the modern American consensus assumes
that the purpose of the contract has been frustrated and therefore sides
with the renters. 122 Frustration cases are traditionally understood to offer
plaintiff restitution because unjust enrichment would result if defendant
retained the contract price when the purpose of the contract has been
frustrated. 12
3
16, at 1201 n.27. Kull argues that because a conscious patient would agree to pay
the fee for the services regardless of the outcome, the same assumption should be
made for the unconscious patient. Thus, to the extent that unjust enrichment is
valued at what defendant would have paid had the transaction been voluntary, the
doctor should receive his customary fee. This explanation begs the underlying
question of why plaintiff's customary fee is the appropriate measure of defendant's
unjust enrichment-a position at odds with the rules in the mistaken improvement
context. Quite to the contrary, the more one looks to plaintiff's side of the trans-
action, the less compelling the unjust enrichment theory becomes.
118. See Christopher Wonnell, Replacing the Unitary Principle of Unjust Enrich-
ment, 45 EMORY L.J. 153, 170 (1996) ("If the rescue effort failed, it is very hard to
see the benefit to a defendant who was beyond medical hope and never regained
consciousness. The defendant's welfare was not increased, nor was her estate aug-
mented by the plaintiff's services.").
119. An alternate resolution can be found in DAGAN, supra note 6, at 210-59.
120. Further, arguments claiming that the overall class of people in B's posi-
tion will be benefited by this regime are unconvincing. The case in Section 9
clearly shows that restitution is concerned with specific facts of the particular plain-
tiff, not the overall class of persons in plaintiff's position.
121. See, e.g., Chandler v. Webster, 1 KB. 493, 499-500 (1904) (finding for
vendors rather than renters).
122. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNT cTs § 265 (1981); PALMER, supra
note 6, § 7.1 (emphasizing renters' expectations on renting room along corona-
tion processional path).
123. See, e.g., PALMER, supra note 6, § 7.1.
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The Reporter finds this explanation untenable. Because the justness
of an agreement pursuant to a contract is defined solely by the terms of
the contract, there can be no unjust enrichment as long as the contract is
in force. 124 For this reason, the "rationalized (enrichment-based) law of
restitution has no independent role as a remedy for disputes arising out of
the breach or frustration of a valid contract."1 2 5 That courts have tradi-
tionally decided these cases under the restitution framework is of no con-
cern; it is simply a smokescreen used "because judges [are] unwilling to
acknowledge they [are] making contracts for the parties."126
What, then, explains frustrated contract claims? While it is insisted
that they sound in contract, 127 1 am unaware of any explanation offered by
the Reporter as to why contract law allocates the risk to the vendor rather
than the renter. Perhaps recognizing this flaw, the Restatement creates a
legal category even more ambiguous than restitution, claiming that
"[d]ecisions [allocating loss to the vendor] may be more candidly ex-
plained ...as authority for the court's power to apportion losses in an
appropriate case," 12 8 or alternatively, that it is a "device to reallocate casu-
alty loss that the payment term of the parties' contract would have distrib-
uted inappropriately." 129
This answer is hardly satisfactory. The traditional approach counsels
that it is simply unjust for the vendor to retain the coronation-only rental
prices in absence of a coronation-a classic justification for restitution.' 30
Because this threatens to destroy the conceptual unity of unjust enrich-
ment, however, and inject unprincipled "equity" thinking into unjust en-
richment, the Restatement expels frustration cases into the common law's
black hole. Unfortunately, the desire to put one doctrinal household in
order creates anarchy in another. While frustration cases are said to
sound in contract, there is no effort to explain how these doctrines cohere
within a rationalized view of contract laur, the problem is simply shifted
down one level. While under "pre-rationalized" law, restitution/quasi con-
tract/constructive trust/unjust enrichment was the catch-all heading for
"equitable" doctrines straddling contract, tort and property, the theorized
124. For a discussion of restitution and contract law, see supra notes 65-88 and
accompanying text.
125. Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, supra note 16, at 1209.
126. Id. at 1210.
127. See id. at 1208 ("The conventional way to describe this alternative is to say
that the court can either deny or allow an action in restitution. Yet, either course
of action turns out to be a form of second-order contract interpretation.").
128. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 34
cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2004).
129. Id. § 34 reporter's note to cmt. d. In still another place, Professor Kull
seems to totally throw up his hands suggesting that these rules are simply "some-
thing else." See Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, supra note 16, at 1204 (discussing
application of restitution without unjust enrichment).
130. See PALMER, supra note 6, § 7.1 (discussing theory of restitution in cases
of impossibility or frustration of contract).
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version rejects this description. To account for doctrines that fail to com-
port with the theoretical model, however, an even more amorphous doc-
trinal dumping ground is created. The Restatement does not even attempt
to justify this category, simply declaring that the transaction can be un-
wound pursuant to the court's inherent power to "apportion losses."'
3 1
This discussion shows how legal doctrine is subject to a law of conser-
vation of untidiness. To use a house-cleaning metaphor, each legal
method has a different way of dealing with doctrinal disorganization. The
realist simply assumes the law is messy and makes no attempt to clean it
up. Post-realist conceptualists use core/periphery techniques to shunt the
mess over to one side of the room. A more pedantic conceptualist cannot
tolerate even a lone messy corner. But the Restatement can no more avoid
the mess than the unreconstructed realist. The dust pile is either moved
to another room (contract), hidden under the carpet (benefit-hiding
the mess there), or just thrown out the window and ignored (courts'
power to apportion loses). Doctrinal sloppiness can be moved, pushed
aside, relabeled or walled off in a closet. No matter what the tactic, how-
ever, it cannot be eliminated.
132
E. The Necessity of Conceptual Justification
A final characteristic of the Restatement's conceptualism is the degree
to which it assumes that a rationalized analytic schema of the law is neces-
sary. What degree of coherence is required? Can a legal rule just sit alone
in the sea of the common law rules, or does every rule have to fit within a
larger, conceptual ordering?
Again, the Restatement is premised on surprisingly strong conceptualis-
tic assumptions. Professor Kull maintains that "[a] complete account of
civil liability... requires the inclusion of restitution.., because there are
important instances of liability that contract and tort, conventionally de-
fined, cannot adequately explain."' 33 Further, restitution cases that can-
not be squared with the unitary principles "require either a different
rationale or a different result."' 3 4
This feature of the analysis ties together the other proclivities. Be-
cause the law is inherently rational, legitimate (read, "correct") exercises
of legal authority must fit into the law's rational structure. The unitary
conceptual basis strengthens this approach because each legal field is
dominated by a single idea that is internally coherent and distinct from
alternative sources of rights and duties, and allows the law to finally break
131. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 34
cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2004).
132. Cf Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis and the Law of Conservation of Ambiguity:
Thoughts on Section 385, 36 TAx LAW. 9, 11 (1982-1983) ("[T]he Law of Conserva-
tion of Ambiguity tells us that the draftsman can control and select what will be left
ambiguous, but he cannot banish or control the aggregate amount of ambiguity.").
133. Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, supra note 16, at 1192.
134. Id. at 1197.
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from the holdover terminology of the pre-modern common law. This con-
ceptualization is further aided by metaphors envisioning each field as hav-
ing fixed and defined boundaries, distinguishable both in practice and
theory from neighboring doctrines and concepts. Ultimately, however,
the integrity and unity of the conceptual system is maintained only by ger-
rymandering the rules until they fit the theory.
IV. POsT-REALIST CONCEPTUALISM
In a broad sense, the Restatement's analytics fit into a larger movement
of neoformalism or neoconceptualism. 13 5 This movement is generally un-
derstood to be composed of conservative reactions to the excesses of War-
ren Court jurisprudence. While the Restatement may share many of the
underlying political motivations with neoformalist jurisprudence, the Re-
statement tends towards a more classical version of formalist thought.' 3 6
A. Neo and Classical Formalism
The "neo" in neoformalism suggests that it takes at least partial ac-
count of the realist critique. Thus, neoformalism is generally predicated
on the belief that legal concepts are devices used to reach optimal social
(or democratic) results.' 3 7 The justifications for neoformalism are ex-
pressed in terms of the practical and political benefits of formalist adjudi-
cation and less in inherentist terms about the objective truth, necessity or
coherence of the conceptual account of law.13 8 While Professor Kull ex-
135. In private law, the classical works are CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACTS AS
PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1981) and Randy E. Barnett, A
Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 269 (1986).
136. The leading (if unpublished) account of neoformalism is Thomas C.
Grey, The New Formalism (Stanford Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series,
Paper No. 4, 1999), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstractid=
200732. Grey argues that the new formalism flows from realist, rather than classi-
cal formalist, premises. Another typology of contemporary formalism is offered in
Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REv 607 (1999). The larger
project of articulating more exact definitions for various strands of formalism and
conceptualism is beyond the scope of this paper. For now, see Duncan Kennedy,
Legal Formalism, in THE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAV-
iORAL SCIENCES 8634 (2001).
137. See Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L.
REV. 636, 642 (1999) (analyzing contemporary formalism and hypothesizing that
"it is the disagreement over the underlying empirical issues-not over large con-
cepts of any kind-that principally separates formalists and nonformalists").
138. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1175 (1989) (exploring dichotomy between following general rules of law
and courts applying discretion to make law). Other elements of Justice Scalia's
approach are outlined in Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal
Analysis, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 581, 589 (1990). Scalia describes legal concepts
as "fictional," but then claims that:
Without such a system of binding abstractions, it would be extraordinarily
difficult for even a single judicial law-giver to be confident of consistency
in his many ad hocjudgments; and it would be utterly impossible to oper-
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plicitly rejects the idea that restitution has an ideal, platonic form, 139 the
Restatement's analysis pulls in the opposite direction. To take but one ex-
ample, the insistence on the unitary conception of restitution has little to
do with obtaining specific results in actual cases. It is rather motivated by
the view that restitution, as a concept, will be rendered meaningless if it is
comprised of both remedial and substantive components.' 40
The distinction between two shades of formalism accounts for some
of the differences between the Restatement and other accounts of unjust
enrichment. So long as courts reach consistent and predictable results,
neoformalists are unlikely to express a preference as to whether the court
formally relies on quasi contract, reliance, restitution, unjust enrichment,
quantum meruit, express contract, implied contract or any other doctrinal
heading. But this is exactly the point to which Professor Kull's project is
addressed. He emphasizes that "[t]he argument here, it bears repeating,
is not about what judges do, merely about the most useful way to describe
what they do."141 This thinking recurs in the Restatement's insistence that,
while it is often the case that restitution and contract produce the same
results, the two categories are "distinguishable in concept."
1 4 2
Finally, from the functionalist perspective, there is no reason to insist
on a single analytic construct to account for the entire law of restitution.
Two or three, perhaps even four or five elements would do just as well. In
fact, several restitution scholars view the doctrine of restitution as encom-
passing several independent analytical bases of liability.143 As long as the
doctrinal heading facilitates the law's functional purpose, there is no rea-
son to force a square peg into a round hole. If the law does not frustrate
ate a hierarchical judicial system, in which many individual judges are
supposed to produce "equal" protection of the laws.
Id.
139. See Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, supra note 16, at 1194.
140. For example, Professor Kull writes:
No legal topic can long survive this degree of professional neglect. Un-
less the means are found to revive it, restitution in this country may effec-
tively revert to its pre-Restatement status, in which problems of unjust
enrichment were treated in isolation, classified only by transactional or
remedial setting: Mistake, Indemnity, Trustees, Subrogation. The loss to
American law, measured in terms of its ability to yield coherent and rea-
soned adjudication, has already been very great, and the outlook is not
encouraging.
Id. at 1196.
141. Id. at 1224; see also id. at 1222 ("The distinction [between Professors Kull
and Laycock], moreover, is of no immediate practical significance.").
142. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 33
cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2004) ("[W]here the contract price of the benefit
conferred is the same as the value of the benefit as determined by the court, the
recipient's liability in restitution-while distinguishable in concept-may be identi-
cal in extent to a liability on the invalid contract." (emphasis added)).
143. Professor Laycock offers three separate bases, while Professor Wonnell
offers four separate bases. Compare Laycock, Restitution, supra note 39, at 1279-81,
with Wonnell, supra note 118, at 191.
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settled expectations, does it really matter whether restitution is said to be
made up of three sub-doctrines? The need for precise legal boundaries,
the inability to accept a core and periphery model and the need to gerry-
mander and exclude nonconforming doctrines are all expressions of the
Restatement's interest in the conceptual structure of restitution.
B. Legal and Pre-Legal Categories
The conceptualism of the Restatement's perspective on restitution con-
trasts with nearly every innovation in legal thought and scholarship in the
past two generations. Maturing and emerging fields include: animal law,
art law, health care law, child law, elder law, various forms of cyber and
computer law, disability law, environmental law, Indian law, natural re-
source law, lawyering for the President, terrorism and the law and W'TO
law, to name but a few. 1 4 4 But in contrast to restitution, these areas have
not arisen because scholars have finally unearthed some central concep-
tual principle underlying each area of the law. Quite to the contrary, they
are based on the perceived significance of the relevant social/political in-
stitutions, or on the understanding that recurring patterns of transaction
and organization warrant the law's attention. Thus, while under a more
traditional arrangement, sports law breaks down into the law of contracts,
anti-trust, agency, remedies, labor and employment, Title IX, business or-
ganizations, agency, local government law, torts, health and disability and
intellectual property law, fusing these rules into sports law gives primacy to
the social rather than legal classification.
The Restatement moves in the opposite direction. Instead of framing
restitution in terms of family law, banking law, consumer protection, mass
tort litigation, local government law, trust and estates, insurance law, se-
curities regulation, corporate law and others, the Restatement adopts the
legal-analytical category of unjust enrichment. This is more in accord with
the classical scheme of legal thought when law was considered in terms of
tort, contract, agency, partnership, bailments, property, equity and
trusts-the doctrinal subjects that have largely fallen out of scholarly favor.
This tendency is echoed in the debate of whether and how restitution
fits into the law school curriculum, where the legitimacy of offering a law
school course on restitution seems entirely dependant on whether one
accepts the conceptual account of the field. 145 Those who argue that res-
144. These fields of law were obtained from the 2006 Harvard Law School
course catalogue. For example, with respect to animal law, see Harvard Law
School, News, http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2001/06/13_animals.php (an-
nouncing Harvard Law School's receipt of endowment to support teaching and
research in emerging field of animal rights law); University of Michigan Law
School, Course Description, http://cgi2.www.law.umich.edu/-ClassSchedule/
aboutCourse.asp?crseid=041258 (last visited Jan. 18, 2007) (describing University
of Michigan Law School's course in animal law); see also, e.g., ANIMAL RIGHTS (Cass
Sunstein and Martha Nussbaum eds., 2004).
145. See Michael B. Kelly, It's Not My Job!, 36 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 887 (2002)
(describing debate as to whether and where restitution fits in law school curricu-
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titution forms an important heading of liability, backing up contract and
tort, typically lament restitution's (non)status in the law school curricu-
lum. Conversely, scholars who assume the "law of restitution" to be illu-
sory typically resist calls to devote curricular space to doctrines spelling out
quasi contractual and equitable liability. As a point of contrast, it is hard
to imagine how the rise or fall of sports law would have anything to do
with the coherence of the central principles underlying sports law. Simi-
larly, constitutional law is taught and studied not because it has a concep-
tual core, but because the doctrines collected under that heading are of
foundational importance to American law. So while Professor Laurence
Tribe recently concluded that he can no longer identify any unifying prin-
ciples in constitutional law, no one expects constitutional law to disappear
from law school course offerings.1 46 In a variety of ways, the legitimacy of
restitution is entirely bound up in the debate regarding the conceptual
coherence of the proposed analytic category.
C. Contrast: The Restatement (Third) of Torts
A final dimension of the Restatement's conceptualism is highlighted by
comparing the Restatement of Restitution with the Restatement (Third) of Torts,
a work that struggles to present a conceptual account of tort law. While
the first two tort restatements collected all of tort law into a single work,
the most recent project divides torts into three separate areas. The ALI
first issued the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability and Re-
statement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability. The initial plan was to balance
the doctrinal fragmentation of tort law by issuing a third work tided Re-
statement (Third) of Torts: General Principles.14 7 This project was to focus on
the conceptual core of tort law, reaffirming the unifying themes in an area
that had come to require three separate projects.
When the ALI began writing the General Principles drafts, there was
little consensus as to what the core of tort law is, or whether such a con-
cept even existed.' 48 Initial drafts assumed the core or model tort was a
negligent accident between two strangers resulting in physical harm. This
decision, however, invited scholarly criticism. Some scholars questioned
lum); Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, supra note 16, at 1196 (arguing that restitution
can be saved from obliteration by framing it in terms of core idea of unjust enrich-
ment); see also Hedley, supra note 65, at 260 (noting that restitution is "being sold
to its potential audience purely on the strength of a theory said to lie behind its
materials").
146. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Treatise Power, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 291 (2005)
(arguing that constitutional law is too incoherent to warrant publication of new
treatise).
147. See Harvey S. Perlman & Gary T. Schwartz, Overview by the ALI Reporters,
General Principles, 10 KAN.J.L. & PUB. POL'V 8 (2000) (giving history of Restatement
of Torts projects); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILTY FOR PH'SICAL
HARM, Introduction (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
148. See generally Symposium, The John W. Wade Conference on the Third Restate-
ment of Torts, 54 VAND. L. REv. 639 (2001).
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why these "stranger accidents" should be considered the model tort, and
why cases such as professional malpractice lay outside mainstream tort
law. 149 Others questioned why tort law should be limited to physical harm
at all, advocating the inclusion of emotional and economic harm into the
core of torts.1 50 Unable to resolve these issues, the ALI revised the scope
and goals of its project. Successive Restatement (Third) of Torts drafts aban-
doned the hope of coming up with general principles of tort law. An in-
termediate draft bears a more modest title: Restatement (Third) of the Law of
Torts: Liability for Physical Harm (Basic Principles),15 1 while the most recent
draft drops the pretense of generality altogether, bearing the title, Restate-
ment (Third) of the Law of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm.15 2 This latest
draft apparently assumes that there is no "core" of tort law and that rules
governing physical harm cannot claim priority over the Apportionment and
Products Liability projects. The failure to develop any mutually agreeable
general principles of tort raises questions as to whether the category "tort"
has any substantive content.
Unlike the Restatement of Restitution, the Restatement of Torts expresses
anxiety over the explanatory powers of legal doctrine. One of the most
debated issues in the drafts was the role of duty, long understood as one
of the doctrinal pillars of tort law. 153 The drafts exhibit deep skepticism
over the operative impact of duty, and present negligence as a three-
element tort (negligence, causation and damages) shorn of the tradi-
tional duty inquiry.1 54 Duty, as described in the Restatement of Torts, is
only to be considered in "unusual" 155 cases, and ordinarily, "is . . . a
149. SeeJohn C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third)
and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REv. 657 (2001) (analyzing re-
quirement of duty element in some instances and not others).
150. See Martha Chamallas, Removing Emotional Harm from the Core of Tort Law,
54 VAND. L. REv. 751 (2001) (exploring conceptual space of emotional distress in
tort law).
151. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIc
PRINCIPLES) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIABILITY FOR PHYSlCAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2004);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES)
(Tentative Draft No. 3, 2003); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAILI TY FOR PHYS-
IcAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002).
152. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (Pro-
posed Final Draft, 2005).
153. See generally Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 149; David Owen, Duty
Rules, 54 VAND. L. REv. 767 (2001); Robert L. Rabin, The Duty Concept in Negligence
Law: A Comment, 54 VAND. L. REv. 787 (2001).
154. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 3 (Discussion
Draft, 1999) (neglecting to include duty as element of tort).
155. See id. § 6. The black letter section states in full:
Even if the defendant's negligent conduct is the legal cause of the plain-
tiff's physical harm, the plaintiff is not liable for that harm if the court
determines that the defendant owes no duty to the plaintiff. Findings of
no duty are unusual, and are based on judicial recognition of special problems of
principle or policy that justify the withholding of liability.
Id. (emphasis added).
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nonissue." 156 Overall, the Restatement of Torts presents a more functional
account of legal doctrine. Rather than gerrymander doctrines into a sin-
gle conceptual framework, the Restatement of Torts is willing to alter or dis-
card longstanding doctrine, and conclude that no single idea unifies the
entirety of tort law.
Finally, there are significant differences in the political economy of
the private legislatures responsible for producing these two projects. By
nearly all accounts, the development of the Restatement of Torts has been a
deeply political affair. 1 5 7 Debates within ALI meetings have largely mir-
rored tort-reform debates in public legislative bodies, where academics
supporting competing industry and consumer interests vie for influence
over the final product.158 This invariably frames the discussions in terms
of outcomes and sustainable compromises, correlatively deemphasizing
doctrinal elegance and analytic coherence. The meetings and debates sur-
rounding the Restatement of Restitution have, by contrast, been far more aca-
demic affairs. There has been little, if any, interest group participation,
and the Reporter has been given an unusual amount of freedom to pursue
his vision of restitution. 159 Participants note that the meetings have fo-
cused more on coherence, elegance and analytics while interest group and
industry politics have been marginal.
156. Id. § 6 cmt. a.
157. See, e.g., Patrick Lavelle, Comment, Crashing into Proof of a Reasonable Alter-
native Design: The Fallacy of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 38 DuQ.
L. REv. 1059, 1067 (2000). Lavelle writes:
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability project should have re-
sulted in an academic and scholarly product, reflective of the lofty stan-
dards to which the ALI previously subscribed.... However, this project,
infected as it was with . . . improper influence, has produced nothing
more than a position paper reflecting the views of special interests groups
with whom the selected reporters are aligned.
Id.; see also Monroe H. Freedman, Caveat Lector: Conflicts of Interest of ALI Members in
Drafting the Restatements, 26 HOFSTRA L. REv. 641 (1998) (outlining and decrying
politicization trend in drafting of restatements).
158. For a general discussion of the political economy of Restatement
projects, see generally Allan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of
Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1995). For a discussion of the Restate-
ment of Products Liability, see id. at 648-50 (discussing various interest groups in-
volved in torts restatement projects).
159. See Gergen, Restatement at Midpoint, supra note 7, at 291 n.10 (noting unu-
sual degree of deference and autonomy given to Reporter of Restatement). Col-
leen Murphy, a member of the Consultative Group to the Restatement, also noted
the lack of interest group participation and the doctrinal nature of discussion,
particularly as compared to other restatement meetings. Interview with Colleen
Murphy, Member, Consultative Group, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND
UNJUST ENRICHMENT, in Bristol, R.I. (Oct. 3, 2005).
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V. WHY Do CONCEPTS MATTER?
Does the conceptualization of restitution actually make a difference?
Does playing around with doctrinal labels and headings lead to different
results? What are the stakes of the Restatement project?
The stakes of the Restatement's doctrinal restructuring are not immedi-
ately apparent. The circular relationship between the conceptual under-
pinning and the actual case law means that the Restatement cannot demand
a broad shift in overall results because if too many cases turn out to be
"wrongly decided," it becomes unclear whether the concept, rather than
the cases, require reconsideration. Moreover, the Restatement project has a
descriptive rather than normative emphasis, and in most cases it seeks to
explain why judges do what they do rather than argue for a different set of
results.
On its own terms, the Restatement is silent on this issue. While it vigor-
ously argues for a renewed understanding of restitution, we learn little
about what is in the Restatement that is not included in the restatements of
contracts, torts, trusts and property. Nor is the Restatement specific as to
what is practically to be gained by arranging the existing rules under the
framework of restitution/unjust enrichment.
Finally, the foundational questions are fairly well settled and beyond
reproach. Neither the Restatement's version of restitution, nor any compet-
ing framework is likely to challenge the central holdings, at least not in a
project that purports to restate existing law. The differences in result,
therefore, lie at the margins of existing case law, usually where one of two
innocent parties must bear a loss caused by a judgment-proof third party
who is actually at fault. The chief contribution of rationalized restitution
is to display a stronger preference for rewinding transactions, and to give
less weight to the countervailing considerations of finality of transaction or
to shifting the loss to the party at fault. In theoretical terms, a nudge in
the direction of categoric reasoning and a shift away from the instrumen-
talism that lies at the heart of cost-benefit analysis.
A. Restitution and Bankruptcy
One difference between theorized and untheorized restitution comes
to light by considering the intersection of federal bankruptcy law and com-
mon (state) law doctrines of constructive trust, which the Restatement classi-
fies as restitution. A constructive trust declares that money or property in
B's hands really belongs to A, and that B must turn it over to A. For exam-
ple, suppose that through a geological survey, A determines that Blackacre
sits atop a valuable gold mine. To finance the purchase of Blackacre, A
seeks a loan from B, telling B of Blackacre's potential value. B denies the
loan and proceeds to buy Blackacre for himself. Courts will find that B
holds the property in constructive trust for A's benefit, typically demand-
ing that both land and profits be turned over to A.
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The hard question is what happens if B goes into bankruptcy. In ad-
dition to A, B is likely to have a long line of creditors demanding satisfac-
tion from B's assets, including the mine. Is the mine A's property, so that
he gets to pull it out of the bankruptcy estate and be repaid in full? Or
must A wait in line and likely get only a small percentage of the mine's
value? This is where restitution theory comes in.
The untheorized view is likely behind the Sixth Circuit's decision
finding that A must wait in line with the other creditors. 160 That court
claimed that unlike a real trust (which is certainly outside the bankrupt's
estate), "[a] constructive trust is a legal fiction, a common-law remedy in
equity that may only exist by the grace of judicial action." 16 1 Since the
constructive trust is a remedy given as justice demands, it creates no "real"
or "hard" rights in the property. While this palm-tree justice might be
appropriate as between A and B, the court found that when the policies of
federal bankruptcy law are at stake, discretion must give way to law.16 2
Therefore, a court must "necessarily act very cautiously in exercising such
a relatively undefined equitable power in favor of one group of potential
creditors at the expense of other creditors, for ratable distribution among
all creditors is one of the strongest policies behind the bankruptcy
laws." 16
3
Not surprisingly, the conceptualized view finds much fault in this
analysis. 16 4 In re Omegas fails to recognize that "f[r] estitution is the body of
law that settles a property dispute between the claimant and the offending
debtor and, at a secondary level, between the claimant and the credi-
tors."1 65 Far from seeing a conflict, Professor Kull argues that restitution
(along with contract, tort and property) forms the baseline rules against
which the Bankruptcy Code is written. 1 66 Courts must address state law
ownership questions first, only afterwards moving on to the distribution
policies enacted in the Code. Since A owns the mine, neither B, nor its
creditors, have any claims to A's property.
B. Mistaken Payments
A lack of respect for the law of restitution is demonstrated in a variety
of transactional patterns involving wire transfers.1 67 An oft-debated New
160. See In re Omegas Group, Inc., 16 F.3d 1443 (6th Cir. 1994).
161. Id. at 1449.
162. See id. at 1453.
163. Id. at 1453 (quoting In re North American Coin & Currency, Ltd., 767
F.2d 1573, 1575 (9th Cir. 1985)).
164. See, e.g., Andrew Kull, Restitution in Bankruptcy: Reclamation and Construc-
tive Trust, 72 Am. BANKR. L.J. 265 (1998) (criticizing Sixth Circuit decision in Ome-
gas Group).
165. Id. at 286.
166. See, e.g., id. at 266-70.
167. See, e.g., Banque Worms v. BankAmerica Int'l, 570 N.E.2d 189, 191-96
(N.Y. 1991); see also Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Central Bank, 49 F.3d 280, 286 (7th
Cir. 1995); Credit Lyonnais v. Koval, 745 So. 2d 837, 840-41 (Miss. 1999).
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York case provides a simple illustration. 168 Company A tells its bank, B, to
wire one million dollars over to creditor C. The message gets garbled so
that B sends one million dollars over to C, but sends another million to a
different creditor, C2. B then asks for the money back from C2, who ref-
uses and argues that a debt is due. A then becomes insolvent, so that B's
only recourse is against C2.
Restitution starts with a presumption that transfers based on mistake
are voidable and that B ought to prevail, unless C2 can show some reliance
on the funds, known more technically as a "change of position" de-
fense. 169 In policy terms, restitution scholars argue that as between B and
C2, C2 has assumed the credit risk of A's insolvency, while B was only paid a
few hundred dollars to wire over the money.1 70
The New York court reached the opposite conclusion, holding that C2
can retain the money, thereby placing the loss on B.' 7 1 Each of the
court's arguments is premised on a law-and-economics analysis which is in
tension with the central aims of restitution. First, the court held that in
the world of instantaneous high finance wire transfers, "efficiency, cer-
tainty... and finality" are paramount values so that courts must be excep-
tionally reluctant to rewind a completed transaction. 17 2 Second, taking a
page from tort law, the court found that since B was the cheapest cost
avoider of this mistake, in order to encourage precaution in the future,
the loss should lie with the bank, B. In a case raising similar issues, Judge
Easterbrook argued that the bank is in a better position to contract
around this result by seeking indemnities of distribution of wire transfers
gone awry. 17 3
Professor Kull's diagnosis of the differences between a restitution-
based analysis and the view offered by these courts is on the mark:
The goal of finality emphasizes the undesirable effects that will
flow from the mere possibility of reopening a completed transac-
tion. Restitution starts from a contrary perception: that... the
avoidance of unjust enrichment justifies not only the cost ofjudi-
cial intervention to reopen a transaction that would otherwise be
over and done with, but also the cost of the additional uncer-
tainty inevitably resulting from the mere possibility of such
intervention. 17 4
Lacking a formalized "law of restitution," the courts saw this case
through the eyes of tort and contract that, as understood by law-and-eco-
168. See Banque Worms, 570 N.E.2d at 191-96.
169. See Kull, Defenses to Restitution, supra note 6, at 929-30.
170. See id. at 922.
171. See Banque Worms, 570 N.E.2d at 196.
172. See id. at 195.
173. See Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Central Bank, 49 F.3d 280, 284-85 (7th
Cir. 1995).
174. Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, supra note 16, at 1234.
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nomics scholars, emphasize the cheapest cost avoider and display the over-
all preferences for transactional efficiency and finality. As a body of law,
restitution brings the opposite polices to the fore. "If all persons who neg-
ligently confer an economic benefit. . . are disqualified from ...relief
because of their negligence, then the law of restitution, which was con-
ceived in order to prevent unjust enrichment, would be of little or no
value."17 5 While simply declaring that a case is decided under the law of
restitution does not answer any hard policy questions, restitution is less
impressed by arguments of finality and efficiency and, over the run of
cases, will likely reverse a greater number of transactions than under com-
peting methodological frameworks.
C. Tobacco Litigation
The preceding examples present restitution in fairly confined terms,
limited to the technical field of commercial transactions. Whether in-
tended by the Restatement or not (and probably not), adoption of the Re-
statement is likely to give plaintiffs' lawyers broader ambitions and, in a way
that seems unique to American lawyering, afford them the opportunity to
employ restitution to embark on large scale social policymaking.
A compelling analysis of restitution's role in the Mississippi tobacco
litigation is offered by Professor Doug Rendleman. 176 For years, the to-
bacco industry successfully defended against tort and product liability
claims pursued by smokers and their families.1 7 7 Eventually, plaintiffs
changed tactics, making the plaintiff the states rather than the smokers,
and making the legal theory restitution, rather than tort.178 Combining
law-and-economics thinking with classical restitution, the plaintiff-states
claimed that the tobacco companies were unjustly enriched because they
did not internalize the costs of the adverse health effects endured by the
smokers. According to the states, since the public paid for these expenses
through Medicare and related programs, the states were entitled to restitu-
tion from the tobacco companies. 179
Rendleman finds the dispute between the states and the tobacco in-
dustry to be about the characterization of the legal claims.18 0 The states'
goal was to show that restitution was an independent basis of substantive
liability having nothing to do with tort, making the industry's long string
of wins under tort law irrelevant to a claim under restitution. By contrast,
the tobacco companies argued that restitution could not provide a remedy
175. ExparteAmSouth Mortgage Co., 679 So. 2d 251, 255 (Ala. 1996); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 5 reporter's
note f (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001) (discussing role of negligence in restitution
claims).
176. See generally Rendleman, Mississippi Tobacco Settlement, supra note 47.
177. See id. at 848-58.
178. See id. at 852-86.
179. See id. at 853.
180. See id.
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unless there was a wrong in tort and that the states were simply presenting
old (and losing) claims under a new dress.
Though the restitution theory was never sanctioned by a court, it
played a role in producing one of the first major victories against the to-
bacco companies.' 81 While even academic sympathizers found the states'
claims beyond the pale, 182 the tobacco bar recognized that substantive res-
titution claims significantly changed the dynamics of tobacco litigation.
The industry folded its cards and recorded its first major loss.' 83
The tobacco case demonstrates why legal categories matter. If an
"area" of the law called restitution exists, lawyers will expect it to contain
some substantive content-a set of doctrines unique to restitution. Be-
cause restitution clusters at the margins of contract and tort, it is likely to
become a repository for claims that fail under the orthodox conceptions
of tort and contract. Restitution has the potential for making new land
available for lawyers that is populated with innovative theories of recovery,
while the resulting growth will nudge the balance of the private law rules
towards those seeking more expansive recoveries. 18 4
D. Is Restitution Pro-Plaintiff?
Two important qualifications must be added to the previous discus-
sion. First, under the Restatement, restitution is not simply a glorified label
for helping out the little guy. In a number of transactional patterns, the
strong restitution ethic that is embedded in the Restatement clearly accrues
to the benefit of large commercial interests. Consider a case where an
insurance company pays out a life insurance policy on the basis of the
company's incorrect interpretation of the policy's terms. Although under
a line of cases dating back to 1858 (and supported by a leading treatise),
the insurance company is deemed to have waived any claims based on con-
tract interpretation, 8 5 the Restatement interprets this as a paradigmatic
181. This is not to deny other factors in reaching the decision, e.g., the fact
that the states rather than the smokers were the plaintiffs, the resources amassed
by the plaintiffs and the shifting attitudes towards the industry's responsibility. It
is, of course, impossible to claim that the same result would not have been reached
under an indemnity theory or by finding a new duty in tort. Nevertheless, the legal
topology offered by restitution makes this result easier to reach and contributed to
the new paradigm of successful tobacco litigation.
182. See Rendleman, Mississippi Tobacco Settlement, supra note 47, at 853.
183. See id. at 864-74.
184. Two immediate examples are claims for Holocaust and slavery repara-
tions based on restitution theories. For a discussion of Holocaust reparations, see
Stefan A. Riesenfeld Symposium on Holocaust Reparations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1
(2002); Symposium, Holocaust Reparations, 25 FoRDAm INT'L L.J. 1 (2001). For a
discussion of slavery reparations, see RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT
AMERICA OWES To BLAcKs (1999); Eric Posner & Adrian Vermule, Reparations for
Slavery and Other Historical Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 689, 700-03 (2003); Sym-
posium, The Jurisprudence of Slavery Reparations, 84 B.U. L. REv. 1135 (2004).
185. See, e.g., Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wager, 27 Barb. 354, 369 (N.Y. Gen. Term
1858) (noting that when insurance company pays claim, it "must be deemed, by
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mistaken payment case and grants the insurance company a claim in
restitution.'
86
The second reservation addresses whether plaintiffs maintain a
greater or lesser chance of recovery under the Restatement's concept-driven
framework. While the Restatement's formalization of doctrines is at the
margins of contract, tort and property, and is likely to increase recovery,
the Restatement's strict adherence to the classical theory of contract pulls in
the opposite direction.
Under the Restatement's scheme, many of the "soft" doctrines of con-
tract (mistake, fraud, duress and undue influence) are taken out of con-
tract and reclassified as providing restitution for unjust enrichment. This
move allows the Restatement to simultaneously account for the doctrines
that falsify the classical ideal of contract, while at the same time reaffirm-
ing the classical version of contract and its primacy in a system of private
ordering.1 8 7 When denuded of its corrective measures, contract law is re-
cast in its classical mode and requires strict and unequivocating adherence
to the terms of the supposed bargain.
The consequences of this view can be seen in cases of unilateral mis-
take. Under the typical fact pattern, a seller drastically undervalues the
property offered for sale, while the buyer, who is aware of the true value, is
eager to make the deal. Although the Restatement asserts a broad concep-
tion of "mistake" within the law of restitution, it also asserts that the con-
tract sets the baseline of unjust enrichment. The contract is therefore
ostensibly valid and enforceable, and the seller must fulfill his obligation
under the contract.1 88 While this approach is consistent with the Restate-
the payment, to have settled, or waived, all questions of law or of fact as to the
validity of the original contract... which they had the means of raising when they
paid the loss"); see also PALMER, supra note 6, § 14.14. This basic view was affirmed
more recently in Universal Acupuncture Pain Services v. State Farm, which denied res-
titution to the insurance company for payments made to an acupuncture clinic
that was unlicensed, and therefore not entitled to insurance payments under state
law. 196 F. Supp. 2d 378, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("[Payee] may not have been eligi-
ble for the benefits in the first place, but good conscience entitles it to retain the
money paid for services rendered."). Under the Restatement's view, this result can
be explained under the bona fide creditor rule. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RES-
TITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 6 cmt. i, illus. 35 (Tentative Draft No. 1,
2001).
186. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 6
illus. 22-23, 25 (Tentative Draft No. 1). Of course, even under the Restatement's
formulation, a liberal view of change of position will result in the insurance com-
pany sustaining the loss. Nevertheless, a prima facie case of restitution is available.
187. This move is made most clearly in the Journal of Contract Law. See generally
Kull, Restitution and the Noncontractual Transfer, supra note 65.
188. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 34
illus. 23-24 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2004); see also Andrew Kull, Unilateral Mistake:
The Baseball Card Case, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 57, 74-77 (1992) [hereinafter Kull, Unilat-
eral Mistake].
41
Saiman: Restating Restitution: A Case of Contemporary Common Law Conceptu
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2007
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
ment's analytic premises as well as nineteenth century contract doctrine,1 89
it is at odds with developments reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts,190 and the leading restitution treatise.1 9 1 These later authorities of-
fer a muddier distinction between restitution and contract, which allows
the seller to back out of the sale on an undifferentiated contract-restitu-
tion theory. By contrast, by expelling mistake from the law of contract,
and insisting on a sharp conceptual separation between contract and resti-
tution, the Restatement (Third) of Restitution would seem to require perform-
ance in these cases.
19 2
VI. THE CONTINUING RESONANCE OF CLAssIcAL LEGAL THOUGHT
The preceding sections demonstrate how the Restatement relies on a
classical variant of legal argument that harkens back to the scholarship of
the late nineteenth century. This concluding section explores why the Re-
statement looks to reprise a method of legal scholarship that has been out
of fashion for nearly one hundred years. 1
93
At the most basic level, the Restatement's posture is grounded in the
need to assuage fears that restitution will generate new avenues of liability
in areas deliberately foreclosed by existing contract, tort and property doc-
trines. 19 4 Such fears are not wholly unwarranted, as restitution is com-
prised mainly of "soft," and potentially redistributive, doctrines which
historically have teetered at the margins of contract, property and equity.
By pulling these doctrines out of the traditional fields, the Restatement of-
fers a conception of contract and property that are untainted by soft law.
Moreover, the conceptualized and rulified account of unjust enrichment
shows how even soft law belongs to a formalized body of law based on the
predictable application of legal rules.
Though this positivization thesis goes some distance, it fails to ade-
quately explain deeper connections to classical formalism presented in the
Restatement. A classic law-and-economics styled treatment of remedies, or a
post-realist description stressing rule-of-law-concerns, would likely accom-
plish a similar result. 19 5
189. See, e.g., Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817) (refusing to
rescind contract for sale of tobacco where seller knew that British naval blockade
would be lifted due to signing of Treaty of Ghent and prices would rise sharply
while buyer was unaware).
190. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (1981).
191. See PALMER, supra note 6, § 12.3.
192. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT§ 34 illus. 23-24 (Tentative Draft No. 3), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS
§ 153; see also Kull, Unilateral Mistake, supra note 188, at 74-77.
193. See generally Kennedy, Will Theory, supra note 93.
194. For a discussion of the potential creation of new avenues of liability, see
supra notes 160-75 and accompanying text.
195. See generally DAGAN, supra note 6 (providing less conceptually adamant
account of restitution); Laycock, Restitution, supra note 39 (same); Wonnell, supra
[Vol. 52: p. 487528
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The attraction of classical formalism, however, extends beyond rule-
based predictability. Conceptual jurisprudence allows the Restatement to
overcome its major hurdle-recovering a legal field under the guise of
"this is what courts have been doing all along." This posture is especially
important in the case of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment, which, by its own argument, looks to reframe existing doc-
trines under a more coherent framework.
It is important to recall the differences between restitution and the
legal innovations spawned by new governmental regulation (ERISA law),
technology (internet law) and the increasing visibility of certain industries
(sports law). Unlike these new areas of law, the principle cases discussed
in the Restatement are quite dated; many of its illustrations have a quaint
texture to them. Furthermore, the Restatement scarcely takes into account
the interventions of the regulatory state and little thought is given to how
securities and banking regulations, or even the UCC, impact principles of
restitution.1 96 Many of the Restatement's rules are already accounted for in
other restatements, 197 and finally, the differences between the Restatement
(Third) and its seventy-year-old predecessor are more terminological than
substantive.1 9 8
It is precisely the tension between the newness and oldness of the
Restatement that makes the conceptual framing particularly useful. It allows
the Restatement to explain why, even though its contents are rather old,
overt discussions of restitution and unjust enrichment have largely been
absent from both legal opinions and scholarly discourse.1 9 9 Conceptual-
note 118 (same). A more law-and-economics approach can be found in Saul
Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REv. 65 (1985).
196. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1
cmt. g (Discussion Draft, 2000).
197. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 31 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 3) ("The rules stated in this Section are consistent
with the treatment of the same subject in Restatement Second, Contracts § 375
and Restatement of Contracts § 355. The authorization of restitution in connec-
tion with oral trusts... is consistent with Restatement Third, of Trusts § 24."); id.
§ 34 cmt. a. Comment a states:
The underlying contract principles to which this Section refers are set
forth in Restatement Second, Contracts §§ 151-157 (mistake) and §§ 261-
271 (impracticability of performance and frustration of purpose). The
restitution claim described by this Section is the same as that referred to
in Restatement Second, Contracts §§ 158, 272, 376, and 377. This Re-
statement presents a substantially different organization of this common
material, without altering specific outcomes.
Id.
198. See HEDLEY, supra note 6, at 201-03 (commenting on GOFF &JONES, supra
note 6).
199. See, e.g., BiRKs, INTRODUCTION TO RESTITUTION, supra note 6, at 3 (com-
paring late development of administrative law and restitution). Birks noted that:
restitution is the more remarkable of the backward pair . . .because,
while the case-law of Administrative Law might be said to have been
called into existence only by the increasingly assertive role of the modern
state, restitution is a central concern of ordinary private law and has been
2007]
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ism answers that while the presentation of the theory might be new, the
underlying concept of unjust enrichment has been directing judicial deci-
sion-making all along. Thus, despite the absence of the unjust enrichment
theory in the case reports, the Restatement's exposition can be said to pre-
sent an accurate restatement of American law. Even more important are
the substantive implications of this argument. Conceptualized restitution
neither expands entitlements, nor redistributes rights, in contract or in
property; rather, it simply offers a more sophisticated explanation of ex-
isting judicial practices.
A related impulse stems from the Restatement's ambitions to not only
restate, but also reenergize an entire field of common law. Given the cur-
rent aversion to judicial (or even worse, scholarly) legislation, the more
restitution can be shown to be connected, integral and inherent to the
law, the greater the chances of its acceptance and integration into the
legal landscape. Classical formalism adds a degree of naturalness and im-
manence that is lacking in the more pragmatic strands of neoformalism
and puts forward the image of the law's three gears interlocking in some
master mechanism.
Finally, we might consider the perceived differences regarding both
the origin and legitimacy of restitution. The case for ERISA, disability law
and most other new areas of law is fairly straightforward. Each body of law
is the product of a specific act of regulation that has little to do with the
coherence, elegance or even justness of enacted rules. ERISA rests solely
on positivist grounding: It is binding and legitimate because Congress has
said so.
When directed at the law of restitution, the same question proves far
more difficult to answer. While the debate has been raging for centuries,
a consistent strand of thought anchors the legitimacy of private law in the
justness, coherence and even naturalness of its principles.20 0 At least at
the level of rhetoric, private law is also understood as foundational law, i.e.
the legal principles that serve as the basis for more specialized areas of
the subject of litigation for as long as the common law has been
developing.
Id.
200. This idea is quite common amongst civilian scholars, who for centuries
have given analytical preference to "real" law-that is law derived from Justinian's
Institutes, as opposed to the native and legislated law of the jurisdiction. This dis-
tinction holds, even though the legislated social law is of far greater importance in
practice. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE, LATIN
AMERICA AND EAST ASIA 7 (1969); ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN AP-
PROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAw 36-43 (2d ed., Univ. of Ga. Press 1993) (1974). Un-
just enrichment was a core category of the Roman law and hints of this approach
resonate throughout the entirety of the restitution literature. In the contemporary
common law discourse, Ernest Weinrib's The Idea of Private Law, is probably the
clearest expression of this thesis. See generally ERNESTJ. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF Pma-
VATE LAw (1995).
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law. 20 1 This likely explains their presence in the first year law school cur-
riculum. No statute imposes the law of restitution and no social/techno-
logical development demands its intervention. Therefore, its legitimacy
and relevance relies substantially on a sense of coherence and authentic-
ity. For this reason, an account that elegantly binds seemingly disparate
and conflicting rules on the basis of conceptual formality, logical order
and principled reason is particularly attractive to the law of restitution.
20 2
In the post-realist landscape, American legal thought has generally
been skeptical of conceptualist legal arguments. The charge of "transcen-
dental nonsense" is the knee-jerk response to an argument predicated on
the authority and coherence of the legal category, and since Holmes, ele-
gantiajuris is more of an epithet than a compliment. 20 3 Yet, as the Restate-
ment project demonstrates, classical conceptualism continues to hold a
powerful sway over contemporary legal imagination.
Writing in the opening decades of the twentieth century, legal histo-
rian F.W. Maitland claimed that while "[t] he forms of action we have bur-
ied .. . they still rule us from their graves."20 4 Duncan Kennedy has
argued that much the same applies to classical legal thought, which con-
tinues to provide the structure of private law jurisprudence. 20 5 Despite
nearly a century of unrelenting criticism, the classical model of a coherent
and integrated private law field continues to provide the baseline through
which restitution is constructed and evaluated. Classical legal thought
may have long lost its original justification and explanatory plausibility,
but like many theological and ritual motifs, it remains etched into the law-
yer's mind as the most basic paradigm of legal thought and still provides a
sense of security, authenticity and continuity.
201. See generally Daniela Caruso, Private Law and State-Making in the Age of
Globalization, 39 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 1 (2006-2007) (discussing how contempo-
rary transnational institutions that are not connected to sovereign state frequently
make recourse to private law reasoning and legitimization technicians of rational
coherence and conceptual ordering); see also generally Christian Joerges, The Science
of Private Law and the Nation State (lain L. Fraser trans.) (Eur. Univ. Inst., Working
Paper No. 98/4, 1998) (discussing role of conceptualist private law in creation of
nation states).
202. See Caruso, supra note 201, at 1; Jeremy Waldron, "Transcendental Non-
sense" and System in the Law, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 16, 31-36 (2000) (discussing attrac-
tion of systemic accounts of law).
203. See Waldron, supra note 202, at 17-18 & n.13 (noting that, while Cohen's
article is seventy-second most cited work ever published in law reviews, in seventy
years since its publication, it has never been subjected to thorough critique); Oli-
ver Wendell Holmes, Common Carriers and the Common Law, 13 AM. L. Riv. 609, 631
(1879) (critiquing jurisprudence of elegance).
204. FREDERIC WILLIA MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAw: A
COURSE OF LECTURES BY F.W. MAITLAND 2 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds.,
1936).
205. Accord Duncan Kennedy, Private Law Theory, Lecture at Harvard Law
School (Spring 2005); see also Gordley, supra note 1, at 1820.
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